


TRIANNUAL

AIRDROP REVIEW AND

MALFUNCTION/SAFETY ANALYSIS



PREPARED BY
THE US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801-1502

AIRBORNE CREED

I am an Airborne trooper! A paratrooper!

I jump by parachute from any plane in flight. I volunteered to do it, knowing well the hazards of my choice.

I serve in a mighty Airborne Force—famed for deeds in war—renowned for readiness in peace. It is my pledge to uphold its honor and prestige in all I am—in all I do.

I am an elite trooper—a sky trooper—a shock trooper a spearhead trooper. I blaze the way to far-flung goals behind, before, above the foe's front line.

I know that I may have to fight without support for days on end. Therefore, I keep mind and body always fit to do my part in any airborne task. I am self-reliant and unafraid. I shoot true, and march fast and far. I fight hard and excel in every art and artifice of war.

I never fail a fellow trooper. I cherish as a sacred trust the lives of men with whom I serve. Leaders have my fullest loyalty, and those I lead never find me lacking.

I have pride in the Airborne! I never let it down!

In peace, I do not shirk the dullest duty nor protest the toughest training. My weapons and equipment are always combat ready. I am neat of dress—military in courtesy—proper in conduct and behavior.

In battle, I fear no foe's ability, nor underestimate his prowess, power and guile. I fight him with all my might and skill—ever alert to evade capture or escape a trap. I never surrender, though I be the last.

My goal in peace or war is to succeed in any mission of the day—or die, if needs be, in the try.

I belong to a proud and glorious team—the Airborne, the Army, my Country. I am its chosen pride to fight where others may not go—to serve them well until the final victory.

I am a trooper of the sky! I am my Nation's best!
In peace and war I never fail. Anywhere, anytime, in anything—
I am AIRBORNE!

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PREFACE

The airdrop review and malfunction/safety analysis is published by the US Army Quartermaster School in hopes that by "passing the word" the malfunction rate within the Armed Forces may be minimized. The review and analysis in this issue covers the period 1 September 1998 - 31 December 1998.

POC AND MAILING ADDRESS

The POC for Airdrop Malfunction Reports, Monthly Airdrop Summary Reports, and any other information concerning the Airdrop Review and Malfunction/Safety Analysis is Mr. Roger Hale. All correspondence for the above reports and analysis should be addressed to:

AERIAL DELIVERY AND FIELD SERVICES DEPARTMENT ATTN MR ROGER HALE USA QUARTERMASTER CENTER AND SCHOOL 1010 SHOP ROAD FORT LEE VA 23801-1502

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

To change your mailing address, please send the mailing label along with your new address to:

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REPORTS AND ANALYSES

The Malfunction Review Board met at Fort Lee, Virginia on 24 - 25 February 1999. A breakdown of the areas in which malfunctions occurred from 1 September through 31 December 1998 follows:

CATEGORY	QUANTITY
Containers/CRRC	21
Platforms	
LVAD	15
Personnel	22

All DD Forms 1748-2 (Airdrop Malfunction Report (Personnel-Cargo)) are reviewed, and any identifying information is removed. Block 24 is annotated to include both Army and Air Force references if only one is given. No grammatical editing is done to the reports.

CARGO MALFUNCTION REPORTS AND ANALYSIS

I.										
	<u> </u>		NERAL							
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD	3. DA	TE	4. TYPE ACF		5. ACFT SER NO.			
		· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		<u> </u>	C-130					
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION	8. DATE AND TIME						
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	. SURFACE WINE	S (Knots)	13. VISIE	ILITY (Feet/Miles)			
N/A	N/A	N	I/A	N/A	A	N/A				
			7							
11.			CARGO							
3. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/NA									
WEIGHT			25.	AERIAL [ELIVERY SYS	TEM USED				
			DUAL RAIL	. CDS REL	EASE GATE	OTHER	(Explain)			
Heavy Equipment	FM 10-500-2/		NO. PLATFORMS	NO. CON	TAINERS	1				
10,000 Lbs	TO 13C7-1-5									
·			2			<u> </u>				
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	29. LENGTH OF LINE	REEFING		TION OF LOAD IN RAFT			
16 East										
16-Foot	G 11D (2)		· F			,	6.0			
Type V	G-11B (2)	22	2-Foot	<u> </u>		1	of 2			
a sustained pull, t Being on the pres	still would not cor he simul handle wo lowdown checklish t called "no drop"	orked very t with the	easily. At th	at point I l	knew sor	nethin				
Upon landing, we hours were over.	runction/FAILURE of left the airdrop lo After removing the handle connected to	(If more span oad rigged e short rail	. No one wa	continue on a nted to loc er on the le	reverse.) ok at it be	t was c	e duty obvious			

ANALYSIS: 1

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Aircraft dual rail equipment failure. The bar connecting the body to the lock bottom broke.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. Material failure. The aircraft was new in 94 and did not have extended use.
- 2. Improper parts were used.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Aircraft maintenance inspection criteria and dual rail qualification needs to be restaffed.

				·			
l		GE	NERAL				
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTI	JRE AIRFIELD	3. DA	ΓE	4. TYPE ACF		5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	OCATION		C-14	4 I AND TIME	
V. O. CHANGO PACAGO					0.0	,,,,,,	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet) 12	. SURFACE WINE	OS (Knots)	13. VISII	BILITY (Feet/Miles)
800 AGL	150 KCAS	150	5	360 @	06	7	+ Miles
IN.		(CARGO				
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/T	DINAVAIR No.)	25.	AERIAL [DELIVERY SYS	TEM USED	
Unilaterial Training	FM 10-51	FM 10-512/				OTHER	(Explain)
Load	TO 13C7		NO. PLATFORMS	NO. CON	TAINERS	1	
3265 Lbs	Chapter 1		1				
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT	RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	29. LENGTH OF	REEFING		TION OF LOAD IN
	AND NOMBER		AIGACHOTE			l and	nai i
8-Foot	C 10E (2)	15 Eo.	at Dinaglat	1			2 of 2
Type V	G-12E(2)	13-500	ot Ringslot			<u> </u>	2 01 2
After the first platt platform was in ar link safety line brothe Type IV link p from the link. The aircraft. The force aircraft. It was evifrom the extraction without incident.	almost inverted bke, the Type IV culled out of the parachute was e never overroded dent to the aircontiller, they called	d position. Wall position. Wall permanent si still attached the right has aft loadmast d malfunction.	Then the extraction the end of the interest of the previous of the locks of the ers that the con, ran the characters	action line e platform k and the e ous load an he second extraction ecklist, an	e tightened. Upon in extraction and the limbal load, and parachud cut the	ed and mpact n line s ne traile ad it sta te had extrac	the Type IV, the pin of separated ed from the tyed in the separated
					-		
	CO	NTINUED	ON NEXT	PAGE			

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The first platform was inspected on the drop zone. The extraction parachute was still attached to the forward end with the Type IV connector link still attached. The bag closing ties were broken and the parachute was out of the deployment bag. The four (double ticket no. 5) stablization ties were still intact, as was the (triple 80 pound) breakcord tie. The Type IV link had a bright mark on it indicating an impact and the platform had a dent in it matching the same dimensions as the mark on the link. The extraction line was recovered with the sleeve of the Type IV link still in it. With this information and after interviewing the crew and reviewing the videotape of the drop from the drop zone, it was determined, as stated above, that the Type IV link struck the platform causing the malfunction. As a contributing factor, the Type IV link was obsolete according to a safety of use message SOU-MES-04-88 and should have been out of service in 1988.

ANALYSIS: 2

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

- 1. Type IV connector link failed.
- 2. Extraction parachute separated from the extraction line.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The Type IV connector link could have been outdated. The link striking the platform could have caused it to break.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Use 2-point link in place of Type IV link
- 2. Type IV should be padded when used.

·	***						
1.		GI	NERAL				
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD	3.	DATE	4. TYPE A C-13		5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION		8. DA	TE AND TIN	1E
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12. SUR	ACE WINDS (Knots)	13. VI	SIBILITY (Feet/Miles)
1200	130			1	0-3		Clear/1
			7_				
111.			CARGO				
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/NA		25.		AERIAL DELIVERY S	YSTEM USI	ED.
	FM 10-527/		DUAL RA	IL .	CDS RELEASE GAT	OTHE	R (Explain)
M198 Howitzer	TO 13C7-10-1	191	NO. PLATFORM	AS .	NO. CONTAINERS		
23,340 Lbs	Chapter 5	- / -	1				
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE		ENGTH OF REEFING LINE		OSITION OF LOAD IN RCRAFT
Type V	G-11C (5)	28-]	Foot				1 of 1

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

Aircraft was first in a 3 ship mission. During approach, the extraction parachute deployed and then broke free of the aircraft. The load gravity fed out of the aircraft never transitioning into main deployment phase. The load impacted the ground 350 yards from the HEPI. The load was completely destroyed.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

According to statements by the aircraft crew, the loading of the platform, startup, taxi, takeoff, route and runin were "uneventful". The loadmasters stated that there was no normal jerk of the opening shock from the extraction parachute felt, but the locks were overcome and the platform "slowly" started to roll out of the aircraft. Once the platform was free of the aircraft, the crew went into normal "completion of drop" recovery operations since they were unaware there was a malfunction. The load was inspected on site, the EFTC link was released and the recovery parachutes were still in their bags with no indication of deployment. The air items were recovered and returned to the rigging facility. Inspection of the extraction line (60 foot 31p) revealed that all plies were broken and burned with multiple abraisons along all plies from the slings connection point on the load to 58 inches down. The line bag panels exterior had melted scrape marks, burns and cuts on them and on the lacing loops where the line extends towards the load. The 1/2-inch tubular webbing and cotton muslin that secure the line to the panel were still in place with burns on them. The extraction parachute had a 2-inch stitching separation at a radial seam (line 36 section 5), no other damage. The extraction link plates were found to be flush and tight to the spaces. The severe burns and 2-3 inch chaffing

burns on portions of the extraction line at the load attachment end are indicators of extreme sudden force being placed on the nylon as it was pulled from whatever it may have been wedged between. During inspection of the aircraft, pieces of green nylon fibers and green Pressure Sensitive Adhesive (PSA) tape "100 MPH tape" were found in the center of the aircraft floor even with the paratroop doors and under the rollers. There was no damage to any rollers or brackets. The Air Force tested the right hand locks and two were found to fail the maintenance test. Lock number 7 had slippage, lock number 9 was out of tolerance (tolerance @2.0 is 48-64, lock tested @66.5). On locks 7, 8, and 9 the "fingers" were not located between the rollers. The "finger" on lock number 6 was between the rollers. The malfunction was caused by the extraction line getting wedged between the platform and rollers, possibly caused by a free rolling/floating platform. During elongation and deployment of the extraction line and parachute, the plies were burned and torn allowing the extraction parachute and extraction line to separate from the load and the load exited to free-drop to the ground.

ANALYSIS: 3

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Extraction line broke.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. Loose platform. 3 of 4 locks released early and platform rolled over extraction line trapping it. When the extraction force pulled the line out, it cut the line.
- 2. Material failure of extraction line.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Calibrate locks being used for aft restratint/right side.
- 2. Maintenance needs to reinstate the lock check.
- 3. Insure all air items are properly inspected prior to use.

1.		G	NERAL						
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD	3. DA	ΓE	1	ype acft -130EI	H(K)	5. ACFT SER N	Ο.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION	8. DATE AND TIME					
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVAT		. SURFACE W		nots)	13. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles)		
N/A	N/A	I.	I/A	Γ	N/A			N/A	
			7						=
III. 23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/N		CARGO I						_
WEIGHT	24. MIGGED IAW (TAITTOINE	A F A III 100.7	25.	AERIA	L DELIVI	ERY SYSTE	M USED		
Sequential		old X dual rail $old .$ CDS				GATE	OTHER	(Explain)	
HMMWV	FM 10-51		NO. PLATFORMS	NO. C	ONTAINI	ERS			
10,000 Lbs each	TO 13C7-	1-111	2						
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		RACTION/RE- PARACHUTE	29. LENGTH LINE	OF REEF	ING	30. POSI AIRC	TION OF LOAD I	IN
16-Foot Type V	G-11B (2)	22-Foo	ot Ring Slot				1	of 2	
31. DESCRIPTION OF M	ALFUNCTION/FAILUR	E/ DAMAGE	INCURRED (if n	ore space is	s neede	d. contin	ne on re	everse.)	
not unlock lock nu again. Number 11 a sustained pull, th Being on the presi- situation. The pilo	still would not con e simul handle wo owdown checklist	me out. No orked very with the c	ext step I atte easily. At the loors still clo	mpted to at point I sed, I inf	o use knev forme	the sir w some	nul ha ething	andle. Aft g broke.	er
the dual rail section	ng the draw bar to	the lock w	vas broken. I ft dropped H	Maintena Es that n	ance i	remov There	is no	inspection	n
	CONT								

ANALYSIS: 4

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Equipment failure. Bar connecting the body to lock bottom broke.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Material failure. New aircraft (94 model).

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Maintenance inspection criteria needs to be changed to identify lock problems.

			7_						
1.		G	ENERAL						
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD		3. DA	TE		4. TYPE ACI C-17	-	5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION				8. DATE	AND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 850 MSL	1	12. SURFACE WINDS (Knots) N/A 13. VISIBILITY (Feetiling) 2 Miles							
			7_						
111.			CARGO						
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/N	AVAIR No.)	25.			AERIAL	DELIVERY SYS	STEM USEC)
8 Foot Mass			DUAL	RAIL		CDS RE	EASE GATE	OTHER	(Explain)
Supply	FM 10-512	2/	NO. PLATFO	ORMS	Γ	NO. CO	ITAINERS	1	
3500 Lbs	TO 13C7-		2					M	lonitor
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		TRACTION/RE- PARACHUTE			ENGTH O	F REEFING		ITION OF LOAD IN CRAFT
Type V	15 RS Drogue		5-Foot						2

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

After drogue deployment, loadmaster saw the drogue at night in the monitor. He called "drogue-ok", then lost sight of the drogue. After the drogue failed to return in the monitor after a few seconds, he called malfunction and completed the malfunction procedures which include positioning the drogue jettison switch to "jettison". The ramp and door were closed and the aircraft recovered safely. No damage.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The aircraft was inspected upon landing. The drogue monitor and IR lights passed the built in test and appeared to be working normally. The drogue has not been recovered yet because it was suspended high in the pine trees. A parachute rigger did observe the parachute from the ground and stated the parachute appeared to have functioned normally. (We are still attempting to recover the drogue parachute.) I believe due to the low illumination on the dark night and the possible low positioning of the drogue in the slipstream, that the drogue was still intact when it was jettisoned by the loadmaster. The loadmaster made a good conservative call on a training load, but this incident should be documented.

ANALYSIS: 5

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Could not determine status of the deployed drogue parachute.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Lost sight of drogue parachute.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Loadmaster training or reposition camera or IR capability.

					Z							,
1.				ENE	RAL							
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD		3.	. DA	TE		i	YPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.
										C-17		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ ANI	LOCA	TION					8. DATE A	ND TIME	
					i							
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEE	· ' i	11. DZ ELEVA		Feet)	12		FACE WIN		nots)	•	BILITY (Feet/Miles)
4000 MSL)5			3	0 Knc	ots			Clear			
				_	7							
101.				CAR	GO							
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGED	IAW (TMITOINA	VAIR No.)	T								
WEIGHT				25.	,			AERIAL	DELIV	ERY SYSTI	EM USED	
	l FN	И 10-512	/		DUAL RA	AIL		CDS REI	LEAS	E GATE	OTHER	(Explain)
	E .) 13C7-1		NO	. PLATFORI	MS		NO. CON	NIAT	IERS		
Training Load	Ch	napter 11			2							
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PA AND NO		28. SIZE EX LEASE		TION/RE- CHUTE			LENGTH O	FREE	FING		ITION OF LOAD IN
8-Foot			•									
Type V	G-12	2E (2)	Rings	lot 1	5 Foot							

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

Drogue parachute was rigged in the left PDM for the second drop of a single heavy equipment platform. At the slowdown check on the first pass, the doors opened and the loadmaster looked up and saw the number two platform drogue parachute and drogue line exit the aircraft and deploy. Drogue was not attached to the second platform and drogue line was secured to the tiedown ring at row B, FS 1188 with 1/4-inch cotton webbing and secured in the 9 retaining clips. No damage to aircraft was found.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

Maintenance personnel inspected the left PDM and no discrepancy was found. The loadmaster rigged the drogue line IAW C-17-9, section 7B-20, para 9 and no other cause was noted. However, a possible conclusion was discussed. Loadmaster stated he had left some slack in the drogue line between the #9 retaining clip and the tiedown ring at FS 1188. This slack may have allowed the line to become caught in the windblast around the ramp area and then the slipstream. This removed it from the clips and pulled the drogue parachute from the PDM.

ANALYSIS: 6

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The drogue parachute rigged in the left parachute deployment mechanism was prematurely deployed. It was not connected to the load.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Drogue line not properly stowed.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Stow line correctly.
- 2. Do not rig drogues for further drops until required.

. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE AI		NERAL	3. DA1			TYPE ACF	·	5. ACFT SER NO.	
. ONLI BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTORE AL	RFIELD		3. DA		"	C-17		S. ACFI SER NO.	
i. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	OCATION			AND TIME				
. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPI	EED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	DN (Feet)	Ī12	. SURFACE WIN	DS (K	(nots)	13. VISI	BILITY (Feet/Miles)	
800 AGL		HCAS	153			Unkno			Clear		
				7_							
)I.		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		CARGO							
3. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGE	DIAW (TM/TO/NAV	/AIR No.)	25.		AERIAL	DELIN	/ERY SYS	TEM USEC	,	
Type V Mass	FM	10-512/		DUAL	RAIL	. CDS RE	LEASI	E GATE	OTHER	(Explain)	
Supply		13C7-1-8		NO. PLATFO	RMS	NO. CO	NTAIN	IERS	1		
3150 LBS	1	pter 11		2							
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE P	ARACHUTE NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE		29. LENGTH O	F REE	FING		ITION OF LOAD IN	
					:						
Type V	G-1	2E(2)	15-Foo	ot Ringsl	ot]	l of 2	
Airspeed in addit	ion to tir	ne in airstre	am is the	suspect	ed ca	ause.					
						_	_				

ANALYSIS: 7

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Drogue parachute apex line failed.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. Drogue parachute deployed too long.
- 2. Drogue parachute material failure. The drogue was new (5 drops).
- 3. Drogue parachute not strong enough to withstand forces.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Waiting on new 15-foot extraction parachutes.
- 2. Design and procure new 15-foot parachute.

1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED										
		2. DEPARTURE		NERAL	3. DA	re	LA	TYPE ACFT	-	5. ACFT SER NO.
. OHIT BLING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTORE	AIRFIELD	I	3. UA		"	C-17		S. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		<u> </u>	7. DZ AND	LOCATION			L_		AND TIME	<u> </u>
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPE	ED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12	. SURFACE \	VINDS ((nots)	13. VISI	BILITY (Feet/Miles)
N/A	145	KTS	N/	Ά]	N/A			MC
				7						
H.				CARGO						
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED	IAW (TMITOINA	VAIR No.)	25.		AER	AL DELI	VERY SYST	EM USED	
				DUAL	DAU			E GATE	ĭ	(Explain)
N /C1/21-				NO. PLATFO			CONTAI		OTHER	(Explain)
Multiple Platforms		N/A								CVR
	07 5/05 0		1 20 5175 547	TA STICKUPS		20 / 51167			20.000	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PA	UMBER	LEASE P	RACTION/RE- PARACHUTE		29. LENGT LINE	H OF KE	EFING		ITION OF LOAD IN TRAFT
			1							
Type V	G-11	B(2)	22	2-Foot R	2S					
). The PI	JWI V	would in			mgnt.	
32. CAUSE OF MALI The PDM function found during the justinessensor was within	oned nor post fligh	n/FAILURE mally the p	(If more sporevious don by the E	ace is need ay and o	ded, on the	continue e previo	on rev us lif Wing	erse.) t. No d Tactic	leficie	ncies were

ANALYSIS: 8 WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION? C-17 computer would not arm. WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN? Aircraft equipment failure. WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING? Identify computer logic faults and fix software.

I. 1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2 DEPA	G RTURE AIRFIELD	ENERAL	DATE	4. TYPE ACF	T 5. ACFT SER NO.		
1. ONLY BEING AIREN TED	2.007	ATORE AND IEEE	"	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	C17	J. Act 1 Sell No.		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION			AND TIME		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knot			12. SURFACE WIN		13. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles)		
N/A	145 KTS	N	/A	N	<u>/A</u>	IMC		
			7					
II.			CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM	IITO/NAVAIR No.)	25.	AERIAL	DELIVERY SYS	TEM USED		
			DUAL RAI	. CDS RE	LEASE GATE	OTHER (Explain)		
Multiple			NO. PLATFORM	s NO. CO	NTAINERS			
Platforms	N/A	4				CVR		
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR-	27. TYPE PARACHUT	E 28. SIZE EX	TRACTION/RE-	29. LENGTH C	F REEFING	30. POSITION OF LOAD IN		
DROP CONTAINER	AND NUMBER	LEASE	PARACHUTE	LINE		AIRCRAFT		
	l			1				
Type V	G-11B (2	2) 22-I	Foot RS					
32. CAUSE OF MAL	FUNCTION/FAIL	URE (If more sp	pace is needed	, continue on	reverse.)			
The airdrop was overcast ceiling. the 5-ship did no	The temperatu				_	d an 800 foot e last 3 aircraft of		
				_				
	CO	ONTINUED	ON NEX	Γ PAGE				

ANALYSIS: 9

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Could not determine status of drogue parachute.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. Equipment failure.
- 2. Atmospheric conditions interfered with camera operations.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Insure aircraft systems have the capability to do the whole mission. Should have infared camera capability.

1.				NERAL							·		
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPA	RTURE AIR	FIELD		3. D/	3. DATE				YPE ACF	r	5. ACFT SER NO.	
										C-13	30		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION						8. DATE	AND TIME		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knot	s) 11	I. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	1	2. SUF	RFA	CE WINE	D\$ (Kr	ots)	13. VISI	BILITY (Feet/Miles)	
985 AGL	140 KIAS 442 MSL 2							2420	@10	\mathcal{C}	7	7 Miles	
		-		7									
III.				CARGO									
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM	IITOINAVA	AIR No.)	25.			A	ERIAL (DELIVI	ERY SYS	TEM USEC)	
Heavy Equipment				DUA	L RAIL			CDS REL	EASE	GATE	OTHER	(Explain)	
Training	FM 10	-500-2	2/	NO. PLATI	ORMS		ħ	IO. CON	ITAINI	ERS			
3650 LBS	TO 13	C7-1-	5	1									
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUT AND NUMBER	Ē	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE ARACHUTE			LEN	IGTH OI IE	FREEF	ING		SITION OF LOAD IN CRAFT	
Type V	G-12E ((2)	15 Foo	t Rings	lot							1	

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

At green light, the parachute deployed normally out of the bomb rack and was visually confirmed to be fully inflated. The load failed to extract from the aircraft so the loadmaster pulled the right hand crossover to emergency. The load still failed to extract so the loadmaster notified the pilot of the malfunction and began his emergency procedures. After applying the emergency restraint chains and just prior to tightening, the load was released and was stopped by the chains. The loadmasters cut the extraction parachute loose from the load and completed all checklists. The loadmasters noted that the load did not move at all at the time the extraction parachute opened. The loadmasters also noted that the load was now rolling aft and forward limited by the chains. This was due to the loadmaster on the handle pulling the right hand all the way to load instead of emergency. The right hand was still in load during the inspection of the aircraft after it landed.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

We tested the number 9 lock. It tested out of limits low. We looked at the platform. We found nothing wrong with it . The recovered extraction parachute was in good condition, no blown panels or broken suspension lines. We even measured the distance between the vertical restraint lips on the dual rails. Nothing wrong there. That leaves me with only one other option which is the possibility that a left hand lock was still in the platform.

ANALYSIS: 10

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Platform did not extract.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Aircraft locks did not release.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Insure dual rails are properly preflighted and maintained by qualified maintenance personnel.
- 2. Insure proper aircrew airdrop procedures are followed.

1.		G	ENERAL						
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	2. DEPARTURE AIRFIELD		3. DATE			4. TYPE ACF	-	5. ACFT SER NO.
			<u></u>				MC-1	30H	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION				8. DATE	AND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WINDS (Knots)			\$ (Knots)	13. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles)	
550 AGL	142 KCAS	614	•	1		9/1	4	7 Miles	
			7_						
111.			CARGO						
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/N		I						
WEIGHT		,,,,	25. AERIAL DELIVERY SYSTEM USED						
			DUAL R	AIL		CDS RELE	ASE GATE	OTHER	(Explain)
Heavy Equipment	FM 10-500)-2/	NO. PLATFORMS		NO. CONTAINERS			1	
3200 LBS	TO 13C7-1	-5	1	1					EFTC
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		RACTION/RE-			ENGTH OF	REEFING		ITION OF LOAD IN
Type V	G-12E(2)	15-Foo	ot Ring Sl	ot					1 of 1

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The extraction parachute released from the bomb rack and inflated normally, the right hand lock released and the load started aft. Just after the extraction phase started, the mains appeared to deploy prematurely, just outside the aircraft, which caused the platform to rotate at the aft end of the cargo ramp. This downward motion caused minor damage to the last three rollers on each of the four roller conveyors. The load impacted the drop zone with no damage.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The JAI was performed on the platform with no problems. The latch was checked and pulled on after lowering the arm and the marks were aligned. After getting the platform back to the hangar, we hooked up the three point link and rotated the arm and it released normally. After returning to the home station with the EFTC, we again tested the system with the same results. Upon further review, ADSB noted that on the cable assembly there were only 2-3 threads showing past the factory set collar compared to 7-8 threads showing on the others. When we checked the latch assembly in the locked position, you could push in on the assembly where the dot and arrow aline.

ANALYSIS: 11

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Main cargo parachutes prematurely deployed just outside the aircraft.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. Improper inspection, maintenance, and rigging of EFTC.
- 2. Item had been recalled by a previous message.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Insure all EFTC components are rigged IAW all TMs, maintenance message advisories, and safety messages.
- 2. Consolidate and disseminate a new all inclusive EFTC message.
- 3. Insure depot stocks are maintained properly.

CFT SER NO.
EFT SER NO.
l l
,
(Feet/Miles)
les
ın)
OF LOAD IN
890
e.)
238
e#90
1 8 e

Load exited aircraft normally. During the transfer to the deployment phase, parachute #238 deployed but parachute #90 only elongated. The load was in the swing when parachute #90 separated from the load and free fell fully inflated. The platform fell with increased speed but sustained no visible damage upon impact. The M-1 release parachute connector sleeve spool and the load suspension link sustained damage and are unserviceable.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The load exited normally. During the deployment phase the M-1 release was pulled to the forward position of the load and struck the front edge with the parachute connector sleeve spool. This contact allowed the parachute connector to be forced from the load suspension link allowing the parachute to free fall unattached to the load. The damage sustained by the M-1: a mushrooming of the left, upper, front, and rear corners of the load suspension link and a large gash in the parachute connector sleeve spool where it contacted the platform.

ANALYSIS: 12

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The M-1 parachute release struck the load. The parachute connector came out of the upper suspension link and the parachute free fell not attached to the load.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Improper rigging procedures allowed the M-1 to strike the load.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Ensure proper procedures are followed.

1								
1.			NERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTUR	E AIRFIELD	3. DA	TE	4. TYP		5. ACFT SER NO.	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE	<u> </u>	7. DZ AND LOCATION				-130 DATE AND TIME		
S. OF ENATION EXCITED		I. SE AIIS	Locamon				•	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	2. SURFACE WINDS (Knots,		(s) 13. VIS	BILITY (Feet/Miles)	
1170 MSL	140	538		110@	4	10	10+ Miles	
			7					
III.			CARGO	,				
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/	NAVAIR No.)	25.	AERIAL	Y SYSTEM USEC	:D		
Unilateral	FM 10-512/		DUAL RAIL		LEASE GA	ATE OTHER	OTHER (Explain)	
Training Loads	TO 13C7-1-	8	NO. PLATFORMS	NO. CO	NTAINERS	5		
3500 Lbs	Chapter 11		1					
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE- PARACHUTE	29. LENGTH C	F REEFIN		ITION OF LOAD IN	
Type V	G-12E(2)	15-Foo	t Ring Slot			l _{F.}	S. 620	
32. CAUSE OF MALE During the invest premature retract	FUNCTION/FAILURI igation, the center ion of the timer blecklist, timer block	E (If more sp	imer mecha g keys. Duri	nism was ng in-sho	found p JAI	broken w , after load		

ANALYSIS: 13

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Main cargo parachutes separated from the M-1 release during deployment. The load free fell to the ground.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

M-1 release timer failed.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Inspect timers properly.
- 2. Do not overuse equipment or overstress timer stem when arming.

1.		G	ENERAL				
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	2. DEPARTURE AIRFIELD		DATE	4. TYPE ACFT	5. ACFT SER NO.	
					C-17		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION		8. DATE A	AND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVAT	ION (Feet)	12. SURFACE WINE	S (Knots)	13. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles)	
1100	130	128 Feet AGL		4		Unlimited	
			7				
<u> </u>				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
101.			CARGO				
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/N/	AVAIR No.)	25.	AEDIAI P	ELIVERY SYST	EMALICED	
WEIGHT			23.	ACRIAL L	CLIVERY STSI	EIM O3ED	
			X DUAL RAII	L . CDS REL	EASE GATE	OTHER (Explain)	
M966 HMMWV	FM 10-517/		NO. PLATFORM	S NO. CON	TAINERS		
9,996 LBS	TO 13C7-1-1	11	1			35 K EFTC	
3,330 EBB	10 150, 1 1		1			35 11 21 10	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		28. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE- LEASE PARACHUTE		REEFING	30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT	
		<i> </i> .					
16-Foot		15-Foo	15-Foot Drogue				
Type V	G-11B (2)	22-Foo	t Extraction	n 16 1/2	Foot	1 of 3	

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The 15-foot drogue parachute deployed successfully activating the extraction parachute and line bag. The extraction parachute anchored the load and the load was extracted perfectly. The main parachutes (G11s) appeared to elongate normally, but during the recovery process one of the G11s appeared to have ripped and became entangled with the other G-11. This entanglement appeared to have restricted the total inflation of the good parachute. Neither G-11B cargo parachute fully deployed, but instead fluttered behind a level and upright platform that impacted the ground and destroyed the HMMWV.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

After a thorough investigation of the entire load, it was found that the G-11 that appeared to be torn had 15 broken suspension lines, damage to the cutter bracket and fire wall on #61. Damage was done to several gores approximately 20 suspension lines were torn away from the lower lateral band and the parachute also had several suspension lines fused together. Cause of damage maybe related to the location of cutter bracket #61. DOM of parachute: April 1963. Placed in service: 15 Oct 98. The other G-11 was found to have an improper

center tie which is located between the locking stow. The tie was not properly girth hitched around the center stow bar of the nylon G-11 bag. The tie was tied with a surgeon's knot and locking knot to the center stow bar loop, then tied a surgeon's knot and locking knot around the lines. Upon deployment the center tie broke at the point of the center stow bar loop, rather than breaking from around the suspension lines. The tie remained tied taut enough around the lines there by preventing the parachute's air channel to open and inflate. Corrective actions: Re-enforce IPs and packer's awareness of correct packing procedures and that they fully understand as well as comply with procedures.

ANALYSIS: 14

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

G-11 parachutes became entangled preventing proper deployment.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. Broken suspension line.
- 2. Incorrect packing.
- 3. Incorrect location of cutter and improper center tie.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Ensure proper packing procedures are followed.

······												
1.			GI	NERAL								
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED 2. DEP 6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		2. DEPARTURE A	RFIELD		3. DA1	DATE			TYPE ACF		5. ACFT SER NO.	
		<u>.</u>				·		L_	C-17			
			7. DZ AND LOCATION						8. DATE	AND TIME		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)		11. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12	12. SURFACE WINDS					13. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles)	
750 AGL	AGL 145 Knots		529 N	ISL		1/2 Knot			ot	5 Miles		
				7_								
111.				CARGO								
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGEI	D IAW (TMITOINAV	AW (TM/TO/NAVAIR No.)									
WEIGHT	1			25.		AERIAL DELIVERY		VERY SYST	TEM USED			
32-Foot Gun				X DUAL	RAIL		CDS RE	LEAS	E GATE	OTHER	(Explain)	
Truck	F	M 10-517/		NO. PLATF	ORMS NO.		NO. CO	O. CONTAINERS				
19,500 Lbs	i	O 13C7-1-	111	2								
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR-		PARACHUTE	28. SIZE EXT	RACTION/RE		29. L	ENGTH O	F RE	FING	30. POS	ITION OF LOAD IN	
DROP CONTAINER		NUMBER	LEASE P	ARACHUTE		29. LENGTH OF REEFING LINE					CRAFT	
32-Foot	İ		15-Foot	t Drogu	e							
Type V	G-1	11B (4)		<u> </u>			Foot			1 of 2		
Type v		(1)	20 1 00.	- Entertie					,,,	<u> </u>		
According to the Adeployed, the panfree. From the grothe aircraft at least 32. CAUSE OF MALE At this time we cat	els on thund I di 5 minu FUNCTIO	ne parachuted not obsertes out. ON/FAILURE conclude that	e started to ve any pa	to blower arachute pace is ne function	out. 7 trail	That ing conti	the ai	rer	they caft, an	cut the	parachute uld not see	
			INUED									

ANALYSIS: 15

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Failure of drogue parachute.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Bad drogue, material failure, or drogue not strong enough.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Procure new 15-foot parachute.

<u> </u>	<u> </u>		ENERAL			,		
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTUR	E AIRFIELD	3.1	DATE		4. TYPE A		5. ACFT SER NO.
			<u></u>			C-	130	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8. DA	TE AND TIM	Ē
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVAT	TION (Feet)	12. SUR	FACE WIN	D\$ (Knots)	13. VIS	IBILITY (Feet/Miles)
1100	130	3	72	1	5		1	7
			7-					
111.			CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TMITOIN	IAVAIR No.)	25.		AERIAL I	DELIVERY S	YSTEM USEI)
			DUAL RAI	IL .	CDS REL	EASE GATI	OTHER	t (Explain)
M CDC	FM 10-500-3	/	NO. PLATFORM	AS .	NO. CON	ITAINERS		
IVIASS CIDS	1 111 10-300-3/			1			i	CVR
Mass CDS	TO 13C7 1 1	1	4	- 1		`		
4,650 Lbs	TO 13C7-1-1					5	_	
	TO 13C7-1-1 27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER	28. SIZE EX	TRACTION/RE- PARACHUTE		LENGTH O			SITION OF LOAD IN CRAFT
4,650 Lbs	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER	28. SIZE EX						SITION OF LOAD IN
4,650 Lbs	27. TYPE PARACHUTE	28. SIZE EX						SITION OF LOAD IN

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

This was a 5 bundle mass CDS with the CVR. At green light, the gate cut normally and the load started to move aft. As the bundles reached section 3 of the CVR, the 2 forward bundles slowed from the rest with 1-3 exiting normally, #4 exited approximately 4 seconds later and #5 jammed in the aircraft. The number 4 bundle landed 30 yards off the DZ. No damage or injury.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

Investigation found a 1/8 inch high x 1 inch wide x 2 inch long piece of skidboard embedded in the leading edge of section 3 (not belonging to the jammed bundle). This CVR section could be physically moved approximately 1/8-inch laterally when checked on the ground. No other problems with aircraft or procedures noted. All skidboards measured 48 x 48. Suspect the #4 bundle caught on the CVR slowing it and causing #5 to shift/cock into the CVR/rail.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

One container on a mass CDS did not exit the aircraft.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The #4 container jammed in the CVR causing the #5 container to shift/cock in the rails.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Prepare skidboard IAW FM 10-500-3/TO 13C7-1-11.
- 2. Ensure CVR is properly installed.

1.		•	GE	NERAL								
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPAR	TURE All	RFIELD		3. D	ATE	TE 4. TYPE ACFT				5. ACFT SER NO.	
	·							C-	-130	30		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION				8. D	ATE A	ND TIME		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots,		11. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)			12. SUR		DS (Knots,)		BILITY (FeetiMiles)	
1223 AGL	120 K (GN)	D)	1424				Cal	m		7	+ Miles	
				CARCO								
111.				CARGO								
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TMI	TO/NAV	AIR No.)	25.			AERIAL	DELIVERY	SYSTI	EM USED		
				DUAL	RAIL		CDS REI	LEASE GA	TE	OTHER	(Explain)	
CDS	FM 10-500)-3/		NO. PLATF	ORM	5	NO. CO	TAINERS		Н	igh	
600 LBS	TO 13C7-1	l - 11					1				elocity	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE			LENGTH O LINE	F REEFING	i		TION OF LOAD IN RAFT	
	26-Foot Hig	h	·									
4 22										2 40 7		
A-22	Velocity (1)	I							F.5	S. 495		

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

This was a single high velocity CDS container rigged using pulley station 550 with the right-hand static line retriever. At green light the knife was slow to cut but eventually did cut and the container exited without any problems. After the drop the aircrew inspected the components and discovered the retriever cable, guillotine knife extension cable, and the 95-inch pulley strap were damaged. The crew continued with the mission and landed uneventfully back at home station. Upon investigation, the ABLE CORP retriever cable was found to be badly misformed at the point it passed through the pulley. The guillotine knife blade was found dull and jagged with the cable end frayed. Burn marks were discovered on the 95-inch pulley strap where the strap passes through the overhead litter brackets. The Type XXVI release gate has a curved cut pattern when examinted flat however, when the gate is folded the cut is straight.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

Suspect a dull knife caused the release gate to roll or curl up leading to the slow cut. The burn marks on the pulley strap and the fray on the guillotine knife cable point to great pressure being applied to the cable.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

ANALYSIS: 17

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The CDS release gate was slow to cut.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. The guillotine knife was dull.
- 2. The CDS release gate was improperly rigged.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Inspect CDS kit components for serviceability (i.e. sharp knife).
- 2. Rig the Type XXVI release gate IAW TO 1C-130A-9.

						,			
I.	,		GI	NERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	IRFIELD		3. DA	ΓE	4. TYPE	ACFT	5. ACFT SER NO.
							C-	130	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8. DA	ATE AND TIM	IE
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPI	ED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12	. SURFACE WIN	ID\$ (Knots)	13. VI	SIBILITY (Feet/Miles)
1223 AGL	130	KIAS	1424	MSL	1	Ligh	nt		Clear
		1	-		!_		-		
				<u> </u>					
111.		 	ı	CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGEI	DIAW (TMITOINAL	/AIR No.)	25.		AFDIAI	DELINERY (SYSTEM USE	:n
WEIGHT				-		1 1	DELIVERY .	1	
				DUA	RAIL	. CDS RE	LEASE GAT	E OTHE	R (Explain)
CDS	FM	10-500-3/		NO. PLATE	ORMS	NO. CO	NTAINERS		
600 LBS	1	13C7-1-11		ļ			3	ı	
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u> </u>				_	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE P AND I	ARACHUTE NUMBER		RACTION/RE ARACHUTE		29. LENGTH C	OF REEFING		SITION OF LOAD IN
	26.5								
		oot Ring				1			
A-22	Slot	(1)							FS 550
Three bundle mas bundles were one started falling fast collapse and free factorials. 32. CAUSE OF MAL Air starvation.	on top o er and fe fall from	of the other of all through to approxima	causing a he lower ately 200	ir starva bundles feet	tion para	for the to chute cau	p bund using th	lle. The ne parac	higher bundl
		CONT	INUED	ON NE	EXT	PAGE			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Container #3 experienced air starvation, lost altitude coming in contact with the parachute canopy of container #2.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause was air starvation.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Inherent with mass CDS operations.

l.					NERAL							
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	NRFIELI	D		3. DA	TE	4. TYPE ACF	-	5. ACFT SER NO.		
								C-130				
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7.	DZ AND	OCATION			8. DATE AND TIME				
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SP		11. DZ		DN (Feet)	12	. SURFACE WIN			iBILITY (Feet/Miles)		
650 AGL	1	130		372		1	Caln	ı		Unrestricted		
		·			7_	*						
III.					CARGO		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGE	D IAW (TM/TO/NA	VAIR N		CARGO							
WEIGHT		•			25.		AERIAL	DELIVERY SYS	TEM USE	D		
					DUA	L RAIL	. CDS RE	LEASE GATE	ОТНЕ	R (Explain)		
CDS	EM	10 500 2/			NO. PLATE	ORMS	NO. CO	NTAINERS	1			
	1	10-500-3/					l ,			1 371 %		
1000 Lbs	10	13C7-1-11]		Hış	gh-Velocity		
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE P AND I	PARACHUTE NUMBER	28.	SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE ARACHUTE	-	29. LENGTH (OF REEFING		SITION OF LOAD IN ICRAFT		
	26-Fo											
A-22	High V	elocity (1)								550		
31. DESCRIPTION OF M	IALFUNCT	'ION/FAILURI	E/ DAI	MAGE	NCURRE	D (if n	ore space is	needed, conti	inue on	reverse.)		
At green light the												
32. CAUSE OF MAI								n reverse.)				
Right hand static	line retr	iever limit s	switc	ch out	of adju	stme	nt.					
										l		
		CONT	INU	JED	ON NI	EXT	PAGE			l		
										l		

ANALYSIS: 19

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The CDS release gate failed to cut.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The static line retriever limit switch was out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Replace western gear static line retrievers.

			7					
1.	** ***	GI	ENERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD	1	3. DA	TE	4. TYPE ACFT CH-4		5. ACFT SER NO.
	<u>_</u>							
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8. DATE A	ND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12	2. SURFACE WINI	S (Knots)	13. VISII	BILITY (Feet/Miles)
1500	90 Knots	385			4 Kn	ots	J	Inlimited
			7_					
101.		····	CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGED IAW (TMITOIN		I					
WEIGHT	24. 1110025 1144 (11111/10/11		25.		AERIAL I	ELIVERY SYST	EM USED	
Door Bundle			DUAL R	RAIL	. CDS REL	EASE GATE	OTHER	(Explain)
(MREs)	FM 10-500	-3/	NO. PLATFOR	RMS	NO. CON	TAINERS	Hig	gh-
200 Lbs.	TO 13C7-1	-11			1	-	Vel	locity
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER		RACTION/RE- PARACHUTE		29. LENGTH OF	REEFING		ITION OF LOAD IN RAFT
	12-Foot High	<i>'</i>						
A-7A	Velocity (1)							1 of 1

31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The 12-foot high velocity parachute was rigged breakaway due to rotary wing aircraft with jumpers following. The bundle did not appear to tumble. The parachute never deployed. The load hit the ground and was destroyed. Upon inspection it was found that the parachute securing tie of 1 length of 1/4-inch cotton webbing was not broken.

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The breakcord tie broke prior to the parachute restraint tie breaking keeping the parachute from deploying. The breaking strength of gutted type III nylon cord and 1/4-inch cotton webbing is too close together to ensure the ties break in the correct order. A proposed change will be submitted on a 2028.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

ANALYSIS: 20

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The 12-foot high velocity parachute failed to deploy.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The gutted Type III nylon cord broke prematurely.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Change rigging procedures to insure the parachute deploys prior to the gutted Type III nylon breaking.

1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED 2. DEPARTURE AIRFIELD 3. DATE C-130 6. OPERATION-EXERCISE 7. DZ AND LOCATION 8. DATE AND TIME 9. ACFT SPEED (Knots) 10. ACFT SPEED (Knots) 10. ACFT SPEED (Knots) 11. DZ ELEVATION (Feet) 400 AGL 140 KIAs 15. DZ AND LOCATION 16. DATE AND TIME 17. DZ AND LOCATION 18. DATE AND TIME 19. ACFT AND TIME 19. ACFT SPEED (Knots) 19. ACFT SET NO. CARGO 22. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT 10. DATE AND TIME 10. D								
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE 7. DZ AND LOCATION 8. DATE AND TIME 9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 400 AGL 10. ACFT SPEED (Knots) 110. DZ ELEVATION (Feet) 400 AGL 12. SURFACE WINDS (Knots) 112. SURFACE WINDS (Knots) 113. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles) 12. SURFACE WINDS (Knots) 113. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles) 123. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT 10. STATE OF THE PARK (Explain) 10. STATE OF THE RESEASE GATE 10. STATE (Explain) 10. STATE OF THE RESEASE GATE 10. STATE (Explain) 10. CVR 10. POSTITION OF HEEFING 10. POSTITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 10. POSTITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 10. POSTITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 10. STATE OF THE RESEASE GATE 10. STATE (Explain) 10. CARGO 12. TYPE PARK (Explain) 10. POSTITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 10. POSTITION OF LOAD IN A								
8. DATE AND TIME 9. ACET ALTITUDE (Feet) 400 AGL 140 KIAs 345 MSL Calm Unlimited 10. ACET SPEED (Knots) 140 KIAs 345 MSL Calm Unlimited 10. ACET SPEED (Knots) 140 KIAS 345 MSL Calm Unlimited 10. ACET SPEED (Knots) 140 KIAS 345 MSL Calm Unlimited 10. ACET SPEED (Knots) 140 KIAS 345 MSL Calm Unlimited 10. ACET SPEED (Knots) 140 KIAS 345 MSL Calm Unlimited 10. ACET SPEED (Knots) 15. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles) 16. DATE AND TIME 17. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles) 18. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles) 18. DATE AND TIME 18. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles) 18. DATE AND TIME 19. CARGO 22. TYPE DAD AND VISITED (VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles) 10. ACET ALI DELIVERY SYSTEM USED 10. DUAL RAIL 1. COS RELEASE GATE 10. DUAL RAIL 1. COS RELEASE GATE 10. DATE AND ALIMERS 10. POSITION OF HARR (Explain) 10. POSITION OF LOAD IN 10. PO	1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPAR	TURE AIRFIELD	3. D/	ATE			5. ACFT SER NO.
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 400 AGL 140 KIAS 345 MSL Calm Unlimited TO ACFT SPEED (Knots) 11. DZ ELEVATION (Feet) 345 MSL Calm Unlimited TO ACFT SPEED (Knots) 12. SURFACE WINDS (Knots) Unlimited TO ACFT SPEED (Knots) 140 KIAS TO ACFT SPEED (Knots) 150 KIAS ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 151 KIAS ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 152 KIAS RELEASE BATE TO ACFT SPEED (Knots) 153 MELL STEAM (Line SPEED (Knots) 154 MELL SPEED (MINIOR	C ODERATION/EVEROICE		1 2 DZ AND	LOCATION				
AUD AGL 140 KIAS 345 MSL Calm Unlimited	6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION	8. DATE	AND TIME	:	
MILITARY LOAD AND WEIGHT 24. RIGGED IAW (TMITO/MAVAIR No.) 25. AERIAL DELIVERY SYSTEM USED 105mm APERS FM 10-500-3/ TO 13C7-1-11 12 CVR 126. FVPE PLATFORM 127. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26. FOOT A-22 Ring Slot (1) 28. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 26. FVPE PLATFORM 26. FVRE PLATFORM 27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 28. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 26. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 26. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 26. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 26. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 26. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT 29. LENGTH OF REEFING	O ACET ALTITUDE (Foot)	40 ACET CREED (Vante) 11 DZELEVAT	ON (Foot)	12 CUBEACE WINE	DS (Knots)	112 1/161	DILITY (Factificial)
NI. 23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT 105mm APERS HVCDS FM 10-500-3/ TO 13C7-1-11 26. TYPE PLATFORMS TO 13C7-1-11 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 28. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE- LEASE PARACHUTE 26-FOOT A-22 Ring Slot (1) 28. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE- LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN ARCRAFT ARCRAFT TO 30 ARCRAFT TO 31 RESIDENTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach								
24. RIGGED IAW (TMITOINAVAIR No.) 105mm APERS HVCDS FM 10-500-3/ 1990 Lbs TO 13C7-1-11 26. TYPE PLATFORMS NO. PLATFORMS NO. CONTAINERS 12 CVR 26. TYPE PLATFORM.AIR 26. TYPE PLATFORM.AIR 26. TYPE PLATFORM.AIR 26. TYPE PLATFORM.AIR 27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot A-22 Ring Slot (1) 28. SIZE EXTRACTION.RE- LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT FS 617 RS 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach	400 AGE	140 KIAS	37.	WISL	Call	11	T OII	IIIIIIIII
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DUAL RAIL COS RELEASE GATE OTHER (Explain) HVCDS 1990 Lbs 10 13C7-1-11 26. TYPE PARACHUTE 27. TYPE PARACHUTE LEASE PARACHUTE		24 DICCED IAW (Tag)	•	CARGO				
HVCDS FM 10-500-3/ 1990 Lbs TO 13C7-1-11 128 Lease paraction/record properties of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach		24. RIGGED IAW (IMI	TOINAVAIR NO.)	25.	AERIAL I	DELIVERY SYS	STEM USEC)
HVCDS FM 10-500-3/ 1990 Lbs TO 13C7-1-11 12 CVR 26. TYPE PLATFORMAIR: 27. TYPE PARCHUTE LEASE PARACHUTE LEASE PARACHUTE LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING AIRCRAFT LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING AIRCRAFT FS 617 RS 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach	105mm APERS			DUAL RAIL	. CDS REL	EASE GATE	OTHER	(Explain)
1990 Lbs TO 13C7-1-11 12 CVR 26. Type platform.air. 27. Type parachute AND NUMBER 28. Size extraction.re. Lease parachute 29. Length of Reefing 30. Position of Load in AirCraft Section of Load in Load in Section of Load in		EM 10 500	3/		NO. CON	ITAINERS	1	
26. TYPE PLATFORM.AIR. 27. TYPE PARACHUTE 28. SIZE EXTRACTION.RE. LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT FS 617 RS 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach		1			1	2		CVR
A-22 Ring Slot (1) S1. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach				PACTION/RE.			30 809	
A-22 Ring Slot (1) FS 617 RS 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach	DROP CONTAINER	AND NUMBER	LEASE	ARACHUTE				
31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach		26-Foot	,		1			
31. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Load failed to exit on right side of CVR, left side exited normally. No damage to equipment was noted. Release gate was cut normally on both sides but right stick stopped moving aft approximately FS 617. Airdrop malfunction procedures were performed without further incident. 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach	A-22	Ring Slot (1)				F	S 617 RS
Right side of aircraft and CVR exhibited moderae friction against some of the skidboards during the loading process. Two containers were rejected. The remaining containers were deemed acceptable by the LMs and JAI. The aircrew reported that the aircraft did not reach	•	617. Airdrop	malfunction p	rocedures w	vere perfor	med wit	hout fu	ırther
	Right side of aircr during the loading deemed acceptab	aft and CVR ex g process. Two le by the LMs	xhibited mode containers we and JAI. The	erae friction ere rejected. aircrew rep	against so The remai orted that t	me of th ning cor the aircr	ntainer	s were

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The right side CDS container failed to exit the aircraft.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. The deck angle may not have been correct.
- 2. The cargo compartment roller trays may have been loose.
- 3. The skidboards were too wide.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Prepare skidboards IAW TO 13C7-1-11.
- 2. Follow aircraft rigging/delivery procedures.
- 3. Insure aircraft dual rails and roller conveyors are installed and maintained correctly by qualified individuals.

I.				ENERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	IRFIELD	1	3. DAT	E	4. TYPE ACE		5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			12.07.440				C-1		
6. OPERA HON/EXERCISE			7. 02 AND	LOCATION			8. DATE	AND TIM	c
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SP	55D (Kanas)	11. DZ ELEVAT	10N (Face)	1,,	SURFACE WINE	DS (K-244)	I 12 1/16	IBILITY (Feet/Miles)
450 AGL		IAS) MSL	12.	310/15			13 + Miles
430 AGL	140	IAS	240	WISL		310/13	Kiiots		13 + Miles
				<u> </u>					
III.	24 DICCE	D LANK /TRAITO/AVA	(AID \$1=)	CARGO		-			
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGE	DIAW (TMITOINA)	AIR NO.)	25.		AERIAL I	DELIVERY SYS	TEM USE	D
				DUAL R	AIL	. CDS REL	EASE GATE	ОТНЕЯ	R (Explain)
A-22 CDS	121	M 10-500-	3/	NO. PLATFOR			TAINERS	1	, , ,
1210 Lbs	1	O 13C7-1-		ļ		1			
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR-		PARACHUTE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	TRACTION/RE-		29. LENGTH O		20.00	SITION OF LOAD IN
DROP CONTAINER		NUMBER	LEASE	PARACHUTE		LINE	REEFING		CRAFT
			Pilo	ot.					
A-22	G1	12E(1)	1	achute				1 1	FS 617
31. DESCRIPTION OF M						·			
aircraft or the CD	S.								
32. CAUSE OF MALI Post mission insp was out of adjust	ection o	of the weste	rn winch	, static lin	e ret	riever, inc	dicated t		
						_			
		CONT	INUED	ON NEX	XT :	PAGE			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's cutoff microswitch out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Remove/Replace and thoroughly inspect microswitch for proper tolerances and adjustment.

1.				ENERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD		3. DA	TE 4	TYPE ACFI		5. ACFT SER NO.
				· <u>· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · </u>	L		C-130		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8. DATE	AND TIMI	Ē
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SP		11. DZ ELEVAT	ION (Feet)	12	. SURFACE WINDS	(Knots)		BILITY (Feet/Miles,
675 AGL	130	Kts				Calm			0 Miles
				7_		·			
III.				CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGE	DIAW (TMITOINA	AVAIR No.)						
WEIGHT				25.		AERIAL DEI	IVERY SYS1	TEM USER)
	FM	I 10-500-3	3/	DUA	RAIL	. CDS RELEA	SE GATE	OTHER	l (Explain)
CDS		13C7-1-		NO. PLATE	ORMS	NO. CONTA	INERS] 1	High
1000 Lbs	1	apter 8		1		1		1	Velocity
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR		PARACHUTE	28. SI7F FY	FRACTION/RE		1 29. LENGTH OF R	EEFING		SITION OF LOAD IN
DROP CONTAINER		NUMBER	LEASE	PARACHUTE		LINE			CRAFT
	26-F	oot	·						
A 22	I .	slot(1)						l _E	S 530
A-22	Kiligi	3101(1)		<u> </u>					5 550
31. DESCRIPTION OF M	ALFUNCT	TON/FAILUR	E/ DAMAGE	INCURRE	D (if n	ore space is nee	ded, conti	nue on r	reverse.)
Western gear retri	ever fail	led to cut a	t oreen lic	ht Retr	iever	activated h	ut shut	off nr	ematurely
Western gear rear	c ver run	ica to cat a	t groon ng	,iii. Itou		activated o	at silat	on pr	ematarery.
32. CAUSE OF MALI	FUNCTIO	N/FAILURE	(If more sp	ace is neo	ded,	continue on re	verse.)		
Western gear retri	ever. Re	etriever wa	s found to	have m	icros	switch out o	f adjust	tment	•
						•			
		CONT		ONI NIT	3 3 7787	DACE			
		CONT	TINUED	UN NI	LXT	PAGE			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's cutoff microswitch out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Remove/Replace and thoroughly inspect microswitch for proper tolerances and adjustment.

				NERAL							
. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	RFIELD		3. DA1	TE			rype acf CH-4		5. ACFT SER NO.
5. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				8. DATE	AND TIME	
). ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPE	ED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI		12	. SURI	FACE WIND		(nots)	13. VISI	BILITY (Feeti M iles)
1000	90 K	nots	407	MSL	İ		5 Knc	ots			1 Mile
				<u> </u>				-			
II. 3. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGED	NAW (TMITOINAL		CARGO							
WEIGHT				25.		1 1				TEM USEC	
D D 41 -	EM	10 500 2/		NO. PLATE			NO. CON	-		OTHER	(Explain)
Ramp Bundle 490 Lbs	1	10-500-3/ 13C7-1-11					1				
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE P	ARACHUTE IUMBER	28. SIZE EXT	RACTION/RE			ENGTH OF	-	FING		SITION OF LOAD IN
3.1.3. 3.1. 7. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1		·•···									
A-21	G-	14 (1)								,	Tail Gate
On the green ligh When it reached immediately. The completely destr parachute.	the edge e contain	e of the ram er turned tv	p, it wen vice in the	t top hea e air whi	avy c le fal	caus lling	sing the g. The A	e T A-2	ype II 21 coi	II gutte ntaine	ed to break r was
32. CAUSE OF MAL Total malfunction go end over end. ' elongate, thus the	of the ea While br	quipment. Treaking the	Γhe conta	iner wa immedi	s top ately	hea	ıvy, wh	nic	h caus		
							_	_			
		CONT	INUED	ON NE	XT	PA	GE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The G-14 parachute failed to deploy.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- 1. The gutted Type III nylon cord broke prematurely.
- 2. The A-21 container was top heavy.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Rig containers IAW TO 13C7-1-11.
- 2. Insure vertical center of balance is correct.

I.		•	GI	NERAL								_
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE All	RFIELD		3. DA	TE			TYPE ACF	r	5. ACFT SER I	10.
C ODERATION SYSTEMS			7. DZ AND	OCATION:	Ĺ				C-17	AND 714	<u> </u>	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION					8. DATE	AND TIME	•	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPI	ED (Koots) 1	1. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Foot)	112	CUDE	ACE WIND	S /	(nots)	12 1/151	IBILITY (Feet/Mi	loc)
925		KIAS	289 M	, ,	"	. JURF	Calm	•	(nots)	13. VISI	7+	162)
723	173	KIAS	2071	-7			Can	.1		1	7 1	
111.				CARGO				-				=
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGEI	DIAW (TMITOINAV		LARGO								
WEIGHT				25.			AERIAL D	ELI	VERY SYS	TEM USEC)	
				DUAL	RAIL		CDS RELE	EAS	E GATE	OTHER	(Explain)	
CDS	FM	1 10-512/		NO. PLATF	ORMS		NO. CON	TAII	NERS]		
1810 Lbs	TC) 13C7-1-8					2			1	GRM	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR-		ARACHUTE NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT	RACTION/RE			NGTH OF	RE	FING		SITION OF LOAD	IN
DROP CONTAINER	AND	IUMBEK	. LEASE P	ARACHUTE			INE			Aire	CRAFI	
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A-22	G-	12E ₍₁₎									FS 1025	
32. CAUSE OF MAL Upon inspection, caused by contact were measured by other screws on the contact.	a groov with the Boeing	e was obser e uplock sto gpersonnel a	ved carv p screw o and found	ed in the on the le	e bot eft ha vithin	tom ind lo	of the ogistic	sl cal tic	kidboa rail ha ons, bu	andle. It high	The scre	
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		CONTI	NUED	ON NE	EXT	PA	GE					

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The CDS container failed to exit the aircraft.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The skidboard contacted the uplock stop screw on the left hand logistical rail handle.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Do not load CDS container in this area.
- 2. Change the uplock stop screw height.

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1.	-	, ,	G	ENERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD		3. DA	ΓE	4. TYPE AC	FT	5. ACFT SER NO.
							C-13	30	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8. DAT	AND TIMI	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPI	ED (Kants)	11. DZ ELEVAT	TON (Foot)	1,,	. SURFACE WIN	IDS (Knots)	12 1/15	BILITY (Feet/Miles)
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III.				CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND	24. RIGGEI	NAW (TMITOINA	VAIR No.)	1					
WEIGHT				25.		AERIAL	DELIVERY SY	STEM USE)
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26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER		ARACHUTE		TRACTION/RE		29. LENGTH C	F REEFING		SITION OF LOAD IN
DRUP CONTAINER	AND	NUMBER	LEASE	FARACHUIC		LINE		Aik	LIME I
	26-F	oot High				•			
A-22	•	city(1)							FS530
	.010	010) (1)		· ·		<u> </u>			15550
Static line retrieve before the knife co		-	gaged and	stopped	d the	retriever :	after the	safety	tie broke bu
						_			
		CONT	INUED	ON NI	EXT	PAGE			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's cutoff microswitch out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Remove/Replace and thoroughly inspect microswitch for proper tolerances and adjustment.

l			GI	ENERAL						
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	RFIELD	3.	. DATE			-130	5. ACFT SE	R NO.
5. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8.	DATE AND	TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)		· · ·	11. DZ ELEVATI	• •	12.	SURFACE WIN	•	· .	VISIBILITY (Feet	
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11.				CARGO						
3. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGE	DIAW (TM/TO/NAV	AIR No.)	25.		AERIAL	DELIVER	RY SYSTEM (JSED	
				DUAL RA	AIL	. CDS REI	EASE G	ате от	HER (Explain)	
CDS	1	<i>I</i> 10-500-3		NO. PLATFORM	MS	NO. CON	ITAINER	15		
1210 Lbs) 13C7-1-1	.	RACTION/RE-	4	1 29. LENGTH O	C DEECIN	4G 20	POSITION OF LO	A D IN
DROP CONTAINER		NUMBER	LEASE F	PARACHUTE	ı	LINE	r neerin	30.	AIRCRAFT	ADIN
A-22	G	-12E(1)		Pilot	i				417	
1. DESCRIPTION OF M			· · · · · ·							
aircraft or load.										
Post mission inspadjustment. Main malfunctions incomestern winch.	ection o	f the right si	de weste he proble	ern winch i em. It has l	indi beei	cated tha n noted tl	t the	cup wa ne last fo	our out of	
						_				_
		CONT	INUED	ON NEX	T I	PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's spring cup out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Remove/Replace and thoroughly inspect retriever to ensure springs properly seat in spring cup during preflight inspection.

l.				GI	NERAL								
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	IRFIELD			3. D	ATE		4.	TYPE ACFI		5. ACFT SER N	10.
C OPERATION SYSPESSES			12.07	4415	064700				Ļ	C13		<u></u>	
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. 62	ANU	LOCATION					8. DATE	AND IIM	t	
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9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) $800\mathrm{AGL}$	10. ACFT SP	EED (Knots)	11. DZ ELE	328	UN (Feet)		12. 50	4-6	ו) כחו	(nots)		SIBILITY (Feeti M il 7 miles	les)
800 AGL		<u> </u>		020		ı		4-0			/	nines	
					<u> </u>								
III.	 				CARGO								
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGE	DIAW (TMITOINA)	VAIR No.)		25.			AERIAL	DELI	VERY SYST	TEM USE	D	
					DUA	RAIL	X	CDS RE	LEAS	E GATE	OTHE	R (Explain)	
		10.700.07			NO. PLATE		-	NO. COL			1	n (Expidin)	
CDS		10-500-3/			<u> </u>		ı	_			1		
1340 Lbs		13C7-1-11			<u> </u>		1	2)		 		
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER		PARACHUTE NUMBER			RACTION/RE ARACHUTE	-	29.	LENGTH O	F RE	EFING		SITION OF LOAD CRAFT	IN
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A22	GI	2E(1)			NA	-		NA	1		<u> </u>	1 of 2	
load consisting of													
32. CAUSE OF MAL	FUNCTIO	N/FAILURE	(If mor	re sp	ace is ne	eded	l, con	tinue or	ı re	verse.)			
Upon inspection of to the pilot parach of malfunction wa	ute was	routed thro	ugh th	ne b	ag clos	ing	loop	on the	e pi	lot par	achu	te bag. Ca	use
		CONT	INUE	ED	ON NI	EXT	ΓPA	AGE					

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

68-inch pilot parachute failed to deploy resulting in G12E remaining in its deployment bag and load impacting ground without an open parachute.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

68-inch pilot parachute's L-bar connector link improperly attached to pilot parachute bag closing loop.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Ensure parachutes are rigged IAW appropriate FM/TO and place increased emphasis on correct JAI inspection procedures.

DUAL RAIL DUAL R	Departion/exercise 2. Departure airfield 3. Date 4. Type acft C130	2. DEPARTURE AIRFIELD 2. DEPARTURE AIRFIELD 3. DATE 4. TYPE ACFT C130 5. ACFT SER NO. C130 5. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 8. DATE AND TIME 10. ACFT SPEED (Knots) 11. DZ ELEVATION (Feet) 328 4-6 7. Miles CARGO 24. RIGGED IAW (TMITO/MAVAIR No.) CDS TO 13C7-1-11 25. ACRIAL DELIVERY SYSTEM USED DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS NO. CONTAINERS 17. DE ARRACHUTE 18. SIZE EXTRACTION/RE: LEASE PARACHUTE 29. LENGTH OF REEFING 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT AA22 G12E (1) 10 f 2 SI. DESCRIPTION OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE/ DAMAGE INCURRED (if more space is needed, continue on reverse.) Both containers exited aircraft normally but the pilot parachute on the first load never deployed. The load landed with no parachute and the load consisting of sandboxes was destroyed. Inspection of the load was performed and we found that the connector link that connects the G12E bridle to the deployment strap of the 68-inch pilot parachute was routed through the bag closing loops of the pilot parachute bag. The cause was improper rigging procedures and										
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			G12E bridle to the bag closing loop	he deploy os of the p	ilot parach		_	_				ough the
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WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The 68-inch pilot parachute failed to deploy resulting in G12E remaining in its deployment bag and load impacting ground without an open parachute.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The 68-inch pilot parachute's L-bag connector link improperly attached to pilot parachute bag closing loop.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Ensure parachutes are rigged IAW appropriate FM/TO and place increase emphasis on correct JAI inspection procedures.

1.			GI	NERAL							_
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	RFIELD		3. DA	ΓE	4.	TYPE ACF		5. ACFT SER N	Ю.
								C-13			
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION				8. DATE	AND TIME		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPE		11. DZ ELEVATI	, ,	12	. SURFACE WII		•	1	BILITY (Feet/Mi	les)
6610 MSL	140 K	CAS	5610	MSL		vbl @	8 k	<u>t</u>	/+	- Miles	
				<u> </u>							
111.				CARGO							
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGEI	DIAW (TMITOINAL	(AIR No.)	25.		AERIAL	. DELI	VERY SYS	TEM USED	1	
				<u> </u>		1 1			ĭ	-	
High Velocity				NO. PLATE		NO. CO		E GATE	OTHER	(Explain)	
CDS			_	NO. FLATE	ORINIS	10.00		MENJ			
600 Lbs	ТО	1C-130A-	9				1		Hig	gh Velocit	y
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER		ARACHUTE NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE ARACHUTE		29. LENGTH (OF RE	EFING		ITION OF LOAD	IN
	26.5										
A 22 D 11		oot High							_	ra 500	
A-22 Bundle	Velo	city (1)				<u> </u>			<u> </u>	S 500	
31. DESCRIPTION OF M	ALFUNCT	ION/FAILURE	DAMAGE	INCURRE	D (if m	ore space is	need	ed, conti	nue on r	everse.)	
cut. (2) No drop ca pulley fell to floor and stitching on 95	(3) Ins ₁	pection rev	ealed 80 j				•			-	
32. CAUSE OF MALE (1) Possible failure maintenance insperinch strap.	e of stati	ic line retrie	ver to de	liver rec	uire	d pull. No	o pu	ıll test	-		
							-				<u>—</u>
		CONT	INUED	ON NE	EXT	PAGE					

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Stitching failed on a 95-inch pulley strap.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Throughly inspect pulley straps prior to use.

			ENERAL						
. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEPARTURE	AIRFIELD	3. DA	TE	4.	TYPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO	
						C-130		<u> </u>	
OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND	LOCATION			8. DATE A	ND TIME		
. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVAT			CE WINDS (#	(nots)	•	BILITY (Feet/Miles	
700	130	19	90		Calm		,	Miles	
			<u> </u>						
l.			CARGO						
3. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (TMITOINA	VAIR No.)	25.	,	AERIAL DELI	VERY SYST	EM USED)	
				177			1		
			NO. PLATFORMS		CDS RELEAS		OTHER	(Explain)	
CDS Training	FM 10-500-3/		NO. PLATFORMS	1 '	NO. CONTAI	MENS			
Load/850 Lbs	TO 13C7-1-11				1				
6. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER	28. SIZE EXT LEASE I	RACTION/RE- PARACHUTE	29. LEN	NGTH OF REI	EFING		ITION OF LOAD IN	
								7 1.0	
A-22	G-14 (2)							FS 710	
without incident. The winch was a 32. CAUSE OF MAI Upon landing, m	xit the aircraft. Mai The load was rigge Western Gear type FUNCTION/FAILURE aintenance and JAI winch including a getermined.	ed with the	e pulley at FS pace is needed el examined	, contin	using th	everse.)	and co	winch.	

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's cutoff microswitch out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Remove/Replace and thoroughly inspect microswitch for proper tolerances and adjustment.

	····	·, .							
I. 1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DEP	ARTURE AIR		NERAL 3	. DATE	i i	4. TYPE ACF1 MC-13		5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	OCATION		·	8. DATE	AND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 3500 Feet MSL	10. ACFT SPEED (Kind		. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12.	SURFACE WINDS	(Knots)	1	BILITY (Feeti M iles) alimited
				77					
III.				CARGO					
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW (1	MITOINAVA	IR No.)	25.		AERIAL DE	LIVERY SYS	TEM USEC)
D 4 1 477				DUAL RA	_	. CDS RELEA		OTHER	(Explain)
RAMZ 680 Lbs	TO 1C-	130A-9)						Ramp
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PARACHU AND NUMBER	JTE		RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE		29. LENGTH OF F LINE	REEFING		ITION OF LOAD IN CRAFT
RAMZ	2 x T-1	10]	Ramp
32. CAUSE OF MAL Unknown.				ace is need	ed, c	ontinue on 1	reverse.)		
	C	ONTI	NUED	ON NEX	(T I	PAGE			

ANALYSIS: 32

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

RAMZ container inadvertantly exited aircraft.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The container not rigged IAW published directives.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Ensure all loads are rigged and inspected IAW published directives.

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		······································	GE	NERAL		······································					
I. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE AL	RFIELD		3. DAT	E		YPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.	
								C-13(_		
5. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION			ı	8. DATE A	ND TIME		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPE	· · ·	1. DZ ELEVATI	, ,	12.	SURFACE WINI	•	•	1	BILITY (Feet/Miles,	
425 AGL	130) kts	395	5		250 @	5 k	ts	J	Inlimited	
				乙							
И.			(CARGO							
3. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED	IAW (TMITOINAV	AIR No.)	25. AERIAL DELIVERY SYSTEM USED							
***************************************	i			—	ī	1					
				DUAL F	_	. CDS REL			OTHER	(Explain)	
CDS	FM 1	0-500-3/		NO. PLATFO	KM5	NO. CON	IIAIN	EK2			
1450 Lbs	TO 1	3C7-1-11				1					
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR- DROP CONTAINER	27. TYPE PA	ARACHUTE IUMBER		RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE		29. LENGTH OF	REE	FING		ITION OF LOAD IN	
	ł				1						
	G10	F (1)			1					FG 7 00	
A-22	G12	E(1)								FS 700	
32. CAUSE OF MAI All rigging and ai microswitch and	rcraft pre beaded c	eparation w hains looke	as in acco	ordance v l. We atte	with	the -9. Th	ne r	etriev			
ground. The retrievealed nothing bad on the retriev	about the		•				ed.		al ins	pection	

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's cutoff microswitch out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Remove/Replace and thoroughly inspect microswitch for proper tolerances and adjustment.

1.				NERAL							
LUNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE A	ARFIELD		3. DA	ΓE	4	I. TYPE AC		5. ACFT SER NO	
			7. DZ AND LOCATION						141		
5. OPERATION/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION				8. DA1	E AND TIM	ŧ	
. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPE	ED (Knots)	11. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12	. SURF	ACE WINDS	(Knots)	13. VIS	IBILITY (Feet/Mile.	
625 AGL	15	50	11	75			Caln	n		7 + Miles	
				7_							
N.				CARGO							
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED	IAW (TMITOINA	VAIR No.)	25.			AERIAL DEI	LIVERY SY	'STEM USEI	D	
				DUAL	RAIL		CDS RELEA	SE GATE	OTHER	R (Explain)	
CDS	FM	10-500-3	/	NO. PLATE	ORMS		NO. CONTA	INERS			
925 Lbs		13C7-1-1							1	CVR	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR	27. TYPE P			RACTION/RE-		29. L	ENGTH OF R	EEFING	30. PO	SITION OF LOAD IF	
DROP CONTAINER		IUMBER		ARACHUTE		۱	INE			CRAFT	
A-22	G-1	14(2)									
parachutes howe ground. The only 32. CAUSE OF MAI The parachute ris the parachutes no 14s had been slow winds on the drop	FUNCTION SET OF THE PROPERTY O	on/FAILURE ared to have	(If more specific two two	of the sl	eded, em. 'ted tl	conti Conti This	inue on r in itsel luring t	reverse. f shou	old not	have cause	

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Two G-14 parachutes failed to properly deploy/inflate after normal exit.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Parachute risers had two twists due to improper rigging procedures.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- 1. Ensure proper parachute packing procedures are followed IAW established directives.
- 2. Drop in high winds only.

		•	GI	NERAL						
. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED	2. DE	PARTURE A	RFIELD		3. DA1	ΓE	4.	TYPE ACF		5. ACFT SER NO.
i. OPERATION/EXERCISE		7. DZ AND LOCATION						C-13	AND TIME	
. OPERA HON/EXERCISE			7. DZ AND	LOCATION				6. DATE	AND IIME	•
). ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. ACFT SPEED (K	nots) 1	1. DZ ELEVATI	ON (Feet)	12	. SURFACE WI	ND\$ (I	(nots)	13. VISI	BILITY (FeetiMiles)
784	1401		142	24		12	,		5.	4 Miles
				7_						
II.			ı	CARGO						
23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT	24. RIGGED IAW	(TMITOINAV	AIR No.)	25.		AERIAI	. DELI	VERY SYS	TEM USEC)
				DUAL	RAIL	. CDS R	ELEAS	E GATE	OTHER	(Explain)
CDS	FM 10-5	500-3/		NO. PLATE	ORMS	NO. CC	NTAI	NERS	1	
800 Lbs	TO 13C						1		İ	
26. TYPE PLATFORM/AIR	27. TYPE PARACI	HUTE		RACTION/RE		29. LENGTH	OF RE	EFING	30. POS	ITION OF LOAD IN
DROP CONTAINER	AND NUMBI	ER	LEASE P	PARACHUTE		LINE			AiRe	CRAFT
	1				:	i				
A-22	26 Foot	t _. (1)				<u> </u>			FS 6	590/PS 737
1. DESCRIPTION OF M	IALFUNCTION/	FAILURE/	DAMAGE	INCURRE	D (if m	ore space is	need	ed, conti	nue on r	everse.)
Loadmaster on the Winch on the right breaking the 80 p never cut, and the aircraft.	nt side of the ound safety	aircraft tie on th	started to	o rewind ine knife	d. The. The	e winch e Type X	stop XV	ped re I nylo	ewindi on relea	ing prior to ase gate was
32. CAUSE OF MAI Western Gear St function. A pull t pression spring v and also within li	atic Line Retest was conc was fully sea	triever V lucted b ted and	Winch way y mainte the bead	as prefli nance a ed chair	ghted nd fo	d and wo und to be ere meas	rke wi	d prop thin li	mits. T	The com-

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Single ply CDS release gate failed to cut at green light.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Western gear static line retriever winch's cutoff microswitch out of adjustment.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

 $Remove/Replace \ and \ thoroughly \ inspect \ microswitch \ for \ proper \ tolerances \ and \ adjustment.$

CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM: AIR- DROP CONTAINER A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALE At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said		7. DZ AND (11. DZ ELEVATI 372 VAIR No.)	CARGO 25. DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	INDS (Knots)	AND TIME 13. VISIBILITY (Feet/Miles 7 Miles
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 650 AGL 10. A 650 AGL 11. 23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM: AIR: DROP CONTAINER 27 A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	ACFT SPEED (Knots) 130 4. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/NA FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-FOOT High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	7. DZ AND (11. DZ ELEVATI 372 VAIR No.) 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	CARGO 25. DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	AERIA CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	C-130 8. DATE INDS (Knots) Im L DELIVERY SYS RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	13. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles 7 Miles TEM USED OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 650 AGL 10. A 650 AGL 11. 23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM: AIR. DROP CONTAINER A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	130 4. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/NA FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	372 VAIR No.) 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	ON (Feet) CARGO 25. DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	AERIA CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	8. DATE INDS (Knots) IT L DELIVERY SYS RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	13. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles 7 Miles TEM USED OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 650 AGL 10. A 650 AGL 11. 23. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM: AIR. DROP CONTAINER A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	130 4. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/NA FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	372 VAIR No.) 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	ON (Feet) CARGO 25. DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	AERIA CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	INDS (Knots) Im L DELIVERY SYS RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	13. VISIBILITY (FeetiMiles 7 Miles 7 Miles 1 M
CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE LOAD AND WEIGHT CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM: AIR- DROP CONTAINER A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALE At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	130 4. RIGGED IAW (TM/TO/NA FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	372 VAIR No.) 3/ 1 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	CARGO 25. DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	AERIA CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	L DELIVERY SYS	7 Miles TEM USED OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
CDS 1000 Lbs 26. Type platform air. A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-FOOT High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	VAIR No.) 3/ 1 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	CARGO 25. DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	AERIA CDS R NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	L DELIVERY SYS RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	TEM USED OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
CDS 1000 Lbs 26. Type platform air. DROP CONTAINER 27 A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	VAIR NO.) 3/ 1 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM: AIR: DROP CONTAINER 27 A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the system the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	VAIR NO.) 3/ 1 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
CDS 1000 Lbs 26. TYPE PLATFORM AIR DROP CONTAINER A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	FM 10-500-3 TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	3/ 1 1 28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	DUAL RAIL NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	CDS F NO. CO 1 29. LENGTH LINE	RELEASE GATE ONTAINERS	OTHER (Explain) High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALE At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	NO. PLATFORMS RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	NO. CO	ONTAINERS	High Velocity 30. POSITION OF LOAD IN
A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALE At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	RACTION/RE- ARACHUTE	1 29. LENGTH LINE		30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
A-22 A-22	TO 13C7-1-1 7. TYPE PARACHUTE AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	28. SIZE EXT LEASE P	ARACHUTE	LINE	OF REEFING	30. POSITION OF LOAD IN AIRCRAFT
A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALE At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	AND NUMBER 26-Foot High Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	LEASE P	ARACHUTE	LINE	OF REEFING	AIRCRAFT
A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	E/ DAMAGE	INCURRED (if	more space is		550
A-22 31. DESCRIPTION OF MALF At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of th worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUN The loadmaster said	Velocity FUNCTION/FAILURE	E/ DAMAGE 1	INCURRED (if	more space is		550
At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with the system of the worked properly with the loadmaster said	FUNCTION/FAILURE	E/ DAMAGE	INCURRED (if	more space is		330
At green light the syst the quick disconnect damage. No part of the worked properly with 32. CAUSE OF MALFUNThe loadmaster said		E/ DAMAGE	INCURRED (if	more cross is		
The loadmaster said	the knife assemb					
	NCTION/FAILURE	(If more sp	ace is needed	l, continue (on reverse.)	
when the knife/quick the knife to fall out.	not notice the kr k disconnect stru	nife discor	nnecting. To of the airc	he knife v raft the sp	vas sharp.	Suspect that
					_	

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Guillotine knife separated from quick-disconnect during single container drop.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Dull guillotine knife caused too much recoil causing it to strike aircraft ceiling and weak quick disconnect spring allowed knife to come out.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Thoroughly inspect quick disconnects prior to use and ensure connectors are properly seated.

TAR	R-N	T/S A	VOI	
$\mathbf{I}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{N}$	CX IV	$I/\mathcal{O}A$		

PERSONNEL MALFUNCTION REPORTS AND ANALYSES

away.

1.				GENERAL	_		_			
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTURE	ē AIRĪ		3.	. DATE	1	TYPE ACFT	7	5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		•		7. DZ AND LOCATION				8. DATE AN	ID TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10. A	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	11	. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)	_	12. SURFACE WIND	DS (F	(nots)	13. VISIBII	LITY (Feet/Miles)
9999		130 Knots		300 Feet		3-5 K	no	ts	Un'	limited
И.	***************************************			PERSONNE	L					
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE, S	SAN, & UNIT	15.	. EQUIPMENT WORN BY J	UMF	PER	T	16. JUMPER'	S POSITIO	N IN ACFT
				Oxygen Twin ALICE Pack	53	w/mask		Ju	ımpma	aster
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.		_	TYPE MALFUN	CTIC)N				19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-INVERSION	\Box	INVERSION	I	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (S	SPECIFY)	
MC-4		PILOT CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPEN- SION LINE		Riser Larm	r under n	30 logged
20. TYPE OF RESERVE		RESERVE FUNCTION		22. RESULTING INJUR	ΙY	J		<u> </u>		<u></u>
MC-4		ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in item 31) X YES	NO	None						
			=				_			
31. DESCRIPTION O	F MAI	LFUNCTION/FAIL	URI	E/ DAMAGE INCUR	REI	D (if more space is	s ne	eded, conti	inue on r	everse.)
The jumper was	obser	rved from the §	gro	und as having d	iff	iculty contro	ılli	ng his ca	anopy	. He was
spiraling out of c	ontro	ol, then the ma	in j	parachute was c	cut	-away. The r	ese	erve par	rachute	e deployed
1 =		np descended s	c		00					

32. CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION/FAILURE (If more space is needed, continue on reverse.)

The cause of the malfunction is an unstable pull. The jumper exited wearing a front mounted ruck. The right shoulder strap became loose allowing the ruck to move freely and causing the jumper to flip several times during free fall. The jumper said he countered the best he could to become stable, but flipped again as he initiated pull sequence. The main basically deployed around his body causing the left riser to catch his left arm and pinned it overhead. The riser under the arm caused the main canopy to turn hard to the left and spiraling out of control. There

	was a delay in the cut-away because the jumper's left arm was pinned, but eventually, he was able to reach his cut-away pillow and activated his reserve. The jumper was at approximately 1000 feet AGL when he came under a full canopy causing him to land off the drop zone.
	CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
76	

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was an unstable pull of the main ripcord by the jumper.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was the jumper had jumped an unserviceable ruck sack.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

This would not have happened if the jumpmaster had conducted a more thorough JMPI of the ruck sack before an airborne operation.

. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED					GENERAL						
VINI BEING AIRLIFIED		2. DEPA	RTURE	AIRFI		3.	DATE	4.	TYPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.
									C-13	0	
OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION				8. DATE A	ND TIME	
ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knot	s)	11. (OZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE W	/INDS (Knots)	13. VISIBI	LITY (Feet/Miles
1000 AGL		130			50 Ft		0			1	0 +
					PERSONNE	L				L	
l. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, & UNIT		15. E	QUIPMENT WORN BY J	UMF	PER		16. JUMPER	R'S POSITIC	N IN ACFT
					•				Not G	liven	
7. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.				TYPE MALFUN	стіс	N				19. NO. JUMP
	<u> </u>	SEMI-INVERSIO	<u> </u>	_	INVERSION	4	CIGARETTE ROL	L	OTHER	SPECIFY)	4
Not Given		PILOT CHUTE			BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPE SION LINE	N-	Not 0	Given	Not Giver
D. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTIO ED PROPERLY (#	N-		22. RESULTING INJUR	Υ					
Not Given		"No" explain in item 31)	一 .	NO	Not Given						
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>									
32. CAUSE OF MAI The evidence su					_					on the	aft hook.
							_	_			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a bent retaining clip on the towed parachutist retrieval system.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was not enough material to properly secure the towed parachutist retrieval system.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

This would not happen if loadmasters utilize two turns single on the towed parachutist retrieval system.

A LINET DEING AIR STEE			3 DEDARTS	DE A12	DEVE	GENERAL	7	DATE	4 -	VDE ACET		E ACET CERMO
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED			2. DEPARTU	KE AIF	KHIÉ	LU	3 .	DATE	l	YPE ACFT		S. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE					1 -	. DZ AND LOCATION	<u> </u>		Щ.	win Ot 8. date al		
B. OPERATION/EXERCISE					ľ	. DZ AND LUCATION			1	6. DA 1E A	TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10	ACFT SPF	ED (Knots)	Ιı	1.0	Z ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WIND)S /K/	nots)	13 VISIRI	LITY (Feet/Miles)
17,500 Feet	1.0.	90 K		ı,		280 Feet		Calm	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			liles
17,500 Feet	ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ	90 K	nots			PERSONNE		Callii			J 1V	mes
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE.	SSAN. &	UNIT	119	5. EC	QUIPMENT WORN BY J		ER	Ιı	6. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	N IN ACFT
,				1	O	xygen, GPS C IC-4 Parachu	on		ľ			n stick
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				IV	TYPE MALFUN	-			π	ά ποι	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)	<u> </u>	SEMILI	NVERSION '	_	Г	INVERSION	T	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (SPECIEV)	-
3.60	一		CHUTE		1	BLOWN SECTION	+	BROKEN SUSPEN-				1
MC-4		1			•		ı	SION LINE		Entai ment	_	
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.		FUNCTION-	-	٦	22. RESULTING INJUR	γ					
	["No" exp			1							
MC-4	1	item 31)	YES	NO				None				
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	15	NO	_!							
32. CAUSE OF MA						_			ı rev	verse.)		
								_				
			СО	NT	'II	NUED ON N	ΕX	T PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a high altitude entanglement.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Improper spacing on exit from the aircraft.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Units should reevaluate HAHO training to ensure proper exit and separation from aircrat.

I				GENER	AL						
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTU	RE All	RFIELD	3	3. C	DATE		YPE ACFT C-130		5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE				7. DZ AND LOCAT	ION			ľ	8. DATE A	ND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet) 1,250 Feet		ACFT SPEED (Knots) 130 Knots	1	1. DZ ELEVATION (Fe	et)		12. SURFACE WIND 7-11 Kr	-	-		LITY (Feet/Miles) limited
1,28 0 1 000 II.				PERSO	MALEI		, 11 111	100			
11. 14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GI	PADE	SSAN RIINIT	I	5. EQUIPMENT WOR		ADE	:R	116	S ILIMPER	'S POSITIO	IN IN ACFT
		337117, 22 0107.		Kevlar/Ho						9th Ju	
17. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.			TYPE MA		_				Juise	19. NO. JUMPS
(SDECITE)		SEMI-INVERSION		INVERSION		L	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (SPECIFY)	
T10-C		PILOT CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION			BROKEN SUSPEN- SION LINE		Part	ial	4
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION- ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in		22. RESULTING	INJURY						
MIRPS		item 31) X YES	NO		None)					
					7						
32. CAUSE OF MAL. The male portion Possible equipme	of	the canopy re	leas	e assembly o	ame					nale po	ortion.
		CO	ΝT	INUED ON	N NE	X	T PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The male portion became separated from the female portion on the canopy release assembly.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The canopy release assembly was not seated properly.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Jumpmaster personnel inspection should find this deficiency.

I. 1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED 6. OPERATION/EXERCISE									
	$\overline{}$			GENERAL	_				***************************************
E OPERATION/EVERCICE		2. DEPARTU	RE AIF	RFIELD	3.	DATE 4	TYPE ACFT		S. ACFT SER NO.
E OPERATION/EVERCICE					1		C-13	30	
S. OF ERATION/EXERCISE				7. DZ AND LOCATION			8. DATE A		
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.7	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	1	1. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WINDS	Knots)	13. VISIBI	ITY (Feet/Miles)
1,250 AGL	ĺ	130 KIAS		Unknown		3 KIAS	ı	Ιt	Inlimited
II.	L			PERSONNE	ı.				
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GR	ADE	SSAN RIINIT	110	5. EQUIPMENT WORN BY J		DEB.	16. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	N IN ACET
14. IAME (LESS, 1753, MI), OIL	AUL,	33214, & 01411	- 1"	. equi men violino	 .		10. 30 11.17 21	. 31 031110	N III ACT
			1	Alice Pack, M	_1·	950	2nd in	ımner/	2nd pass
43 T/05 0404 CHUTS	40			•	_		Ziid je	iiipci/	19. NO. JUMPS
17. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.		·	TYPE MALFUN					19. NO. JUMPS
	 	SEMI-INVERSION	-	INVERSION	4	CIGARETTE ROLL	OTHER (SPECIFY)	4
MC 1 1C		PILOT CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION	1	BROKEN SUSPEN-			52
MC-1-1C			ل_ل		Ц	SION LINE	Entang	lement	32
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION- ED PROPERLY (#		22. RESULTING INJUR	Y				
		"No" explain in item 31)							
T-10R		YES] NO	Non	e				
	느				-				
second jumper en unable to untangle. The reserve did no reserve. The third curred. 32. CAUSE OF MAL. The third jumper laway quick enoug	e. T ot d l jui LFUI	The third jump leploy past the mper receive	per d le fin d a r	leployed his reserved regular stow. minor cut to his f more space is ne	erv Tł che	e at approximate second jumpeek but did not ed, continue on r	everse.)	0 feet and the feet of the fee	AGL. bloy his t oc-

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a midair entanglement.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was improper canopy control.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- Adhere to the three rules of the air:
 1. Maintain 50 foot separation from other jumpers.
 2. Turn right to avoid collision.
 3. Lower jumper has the right of way.

l.					GENERAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED			2. DEPARTU	RE AIR	FIELD	3.	DATE	4. TYPE A	C-130P	5. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE			1		7. DZ AND LOCATION				TE AND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPI	EED (Knots)	11	. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WINDS	(Knots)	13. VISIB	LITY (Feet/Miles)
17,999 MSL		130	Knots	1	5,200 MSL		5 Kno	ots	6	Miles
II.					PERSONNE	L		•		
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GR	ADE,	SSAN, &	UNIT	15.	MC-4 with Ox			16. JUN	wper's position $4~{ m of}$	
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFUN			<u> </u>	101	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-I	INVERSION '		INVERSION		CIGARETTE ROLL	ОТН	HER (SPECIFY)	
MC-4		PILOT	CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPEN- SION LINE		ne Twist/ ung Slide	37
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	ED PRO I	FUNCTION- PERLY (If oplain in	<u></u>	22. RESULTING INJUR	Y		111	ang once	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
MC-4		item 31)) YES	NO			None			
bowtie, end cells clear the twists. Justine NCO stated to 32. CAUSE OF MAL Malfunction NCO sion lines. He ren It was. Malfunctio bicycle. Once found on canopy. an Army Parachur	umj 500 he o FUN O in nov on I free NC	per all feet canop scrion spectal feet the NCO effond TE:	so states AGL jur by looked N/FAILURI ted the pa e twists a stated th n twists t Team me	he vanped no E (If aracand control the state t	was falling faster cutaway and to rmal with the emore space is need to detect to detec	er ti he xce dec and rm	han the other reserve funct eption of the hand three ine if the canal the we removed ome all the w	team ioned nung s reverse twists opy w the two yay do	members properly slider.) s still in the vas in provists if he own. No co	s (backed . Malfunc- ne suspen- per layout. continued lamage was
			СО	NT.	INUED ON N	EX	KT PAGE			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a hung slider caused by twists in the suspension line.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was improper body position.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Jumper should attend remedial training.

							<u></u> -				
•					GENERAL						
. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED			2. DEPARTU	RE AIR	FIELD	3.	DATE	4. 1	TYPE ACFT		S. ACFT SER NO.
			_			<u> </u>		Ц,	C-13		
5. OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION				8. DATE A	ND TIME	
). ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEE	D (Knots)	11	I. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WIN	DS (K	(nots)	13. VISIBI	LITY (Feeti M iles)
1250 AGL		13	30		710		2		-	Cle	ear
II.					PERSONNE	-					
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, & U	INIT	15	EQUIPMENT WORN BY J)MP	PER	1	16. JUMPER	's Positio	N IN ACFT
					· Kevlar, LB	V.	Rucksack				eft Door
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFUNG					J o o	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-IN	VERSION '		INVERSION	floor	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (SPECIFY)	
MC1-1C		PILOT	HUTE	X	BLOWN SECTION	7	BROKEN SUSPEN- SION LINE				56
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE F	UNCTION	Λ	22. RESULTING INJUR	<u>}</u>			L		30
-		ED PROPE	RLY (H		1						
T-10		item 31)									
1-10		<u></u> Ч	ES	NO	1						
32. CAUSE OF MAI Excesssive aircra caused numerous that the broken co	ıft s _] twi	peed n	nay hav he para	e be	en a factor. Imp	roj e d	per jumper b amage. Furt	ood her	ly posit exami	nation	revealed

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was broken control lines and blown gore sections of the main parachute.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was excessive speed of the aircraft, improper packing procedures, and suspension lines too tight.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

This would not have happened if proper packing procedures were adhered to and the aircraft had not been flying too fast. The packer should check the main parachute for control lines being too tight.

l.					GENERAL						***************************************
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DI	EPARTUI	RE AIRI	FIELD	3.	DATE	4. TYPE ACFT			5. ACFT SER NO.
						<u>L</u>		Щ	MC-1:		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION				8. DATE A	ND TIME	
							,				
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (K	-	111	DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WI	-	· ·		LITY (Feet/Miles)
25,000 MSL	<u></u>	130 Kn	ots		5,200 MSL		31	Kno	ots		Unlimited
II.				Le	PERSONNE						
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GR	ADE,	SSAN, & UNII		115.	EQUIPMENT WORN BY	OMP	EK		16. JUMPER	S POSITIO	IN IN ACFI
					MC-4/02/Ruc	ksa	ack		7 of	10	
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFUN	CTIO	N			•	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)	┢	SEMI-INVER	SION '	П	INVERSION	Т	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (S	SPECIFY)	7
		PILOT CHUT		\Box	BLOWN SECTION	7	BROKEN SUSPEN		Broke		
MC-4							SION LINE		Contr		e 250+
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNC			22. RESULTING INJUR	Υ					
		"No" explain . item 31)									
MC-4	1	YES		NO	Non	e					
	<u> </u>							•			,
32. CAUSE OF MAL Canopy was never speculative. High Jumper states he possible cause.	er re alti	ecovered itude DZs	, ther s com	efor abine	re, it could not bed with high alt	e i tuc	nspected. C de jumps co	Caus	se of the nonly br	eak co	ontrol lines.
			СО	NT	INUED ON N	EX	T PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Broken control lines.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Worn control lines. High altitude opening commonly break control lines.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Packer should check for worn control lines.

						_					
I. 1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPART	JRE A	RFI	GENERAL	3	DATE	4. T	YPE ACFT	-	S. ACFT SER NO.
SERVE PRINCIPLE		1. 55 480		1		,		C-13			
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE				7	7. DZ AND LOCATION	L		Т	8. DATE A		
				ı				- 1			
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	1	11.	DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WINDS	s (Ki	nots)	13. VISIBII	ITY (FeetiMiles)
800 Feet AGL	l	130 Knots			Unknown		3-5 Kn	ots	\mathbf{s}		ht 2002
II.	J			_	PERSONNEL						,
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GI	ADE,	SSAN, & UNIT]1	5. E	QUIPMENT WORN BY JU		ER	1	6. JUMPER	's POSITIO	N IN ACFT
			- 1	ī	VB, Assault P	ac	k. M-1950	ı			
					Mod/Saw)		11,111 1900	ı		1/6 Le	ft Door
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFUNC	TIO	N			•	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)	┢	SEMI-INVERSION	Т	Τ	INVERSION	Т	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (S	SPECIFY)	
T-10C Personnel		PILOT CHUTE	1	Т	BLOWN SECTION	BROKEN SUSPEN-			Severe	ed Statio	3
Parachute	l	İ				ı	SION LINE		Line		25
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION-		_	22. RESULTING INJURY	′					
24 Foot		ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in			1						
Troop Chest		item 31)	1		None						
Reserve		X YES	NC		<u> </u>						
						=					
After inspecting snap hook. The a anchor line cable troop door. Suspinto the V shape main parachute r	the ircr of ecte	static line, it raft was inspe the left door. ed cause: Jun tion of the lef	was ecte The iper	s s d a e s r h	evered at 31 inc and the static li- tatic measured ad extremely v s, severing the s	che ne ou vea tat	es from the p in question v at to a sharp (ak exit, static tic line at 31 i	oir vas "V w	nt of co s reatta ''' shap as forc	iched to be) por ced up	o the tion of the and lodged
		CC	ΝΊ	ΓI	NUED ON NI	E X	KT PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a broken static lnie.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause was a poor exit causing the jumpers static line to ride low. Therefore allowing it to be cut by the V-shape on the lower portion of the jump door.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

In order to ensure this does not happen, the door exit is currently being reevaluated.

					CENEDA!							
. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		1 2	. DEPARTU	RE AIR	GENERAL FIELD	3.1	DATE	4. 1	YPE ACFT		S. ACFT SER NO.	
								"	C130			
. OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION	<u> </u>		4	8. DATE A			
. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEE	(Knots)	11	. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WIN	DS (K	nots)	13. VISIBII	.ITY (Feet/Miles)	
1250	13	0		385		3 K	Knots Unli		imited			
I.					PERSONNI	L				<u> </u>		
4. NAME (Last, First, MI), GI	RADE,	SSAN, & UI	NIT	15	EQUIPMENT WORN BY	UMPI	ER	1	6. JUMPER	's Positio	N IN ACFT	
					LCE, Al	ice	Pack		2	2nd Pa	ss/13	
7. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.				TYPE MALFU	ICTIO	N				19. NO. JUMP	
(SDECITY		SEMI-IN\	ersion '		INVERSION	\perp	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (SPECIFY)]	
MC1-1C		PILOT C	IUTE		BLOWN SECTION	BROKEN SUSPEN-			Blov		55	
	<u> </u>			Ш			SION LINE	LINE Sections				
0. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FL ED PROPE	FUNCTION- 22. RESULTING INJURY PERLY (H									
24-Foot Troop		"No" explaitem 31)	in in									
Chest		YE	s 🔲	NO	N	lone	e					
revealed a 20-in destroyed gore 4, control line b and gores 13 this but it could not 20 jumps and no malfunction have 32. CAUSE OF MAL No determination up will be submits	16 s ridl oug be c his ve b	sec 4 & e broke e broke h 22. I letermine tory of een for	5, and en in tweet and in tweet and if it mainted warded	l gor yo p stite it ca enar d to	re 14 sec 3, the laces, and mind ching was found used or was cauce. This parack Natick for testing more space is ne	orifor by d in used nute ng.	face modifi- urns and ho a several pla d by the fail along with	catales aces	ion wa in gore on the . The p other fr	s torn es 3 thr e radial parachu om a si	off gore ough 10, seam, ate had imilar	
			co	NT	INUED ON N	EX	T PAGE					

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a blown gore section.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was a material defect.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Maintain proper aircraft speed and ensure the air channel is cleared during packing process.

						_					
I. 1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPART	URF A	IRFI	GENERAL	3 (DATE	4. TV	PE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.
. Our being Amen teb		1.00	VIII A			,,,		٠	C-130		J. ACI 1 JEN NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE		1		-	7. DZ AND LOCATION			16	C-13		
ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knots)		11. (OZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WIND	S (Kn	ots)	13. VISIBI	LITY (Feet/Miles)
1250 Feet		130 Knots			280 Feet		0-5 Kr	ot	S		Clear
II.					PERSONNEL	-					
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GF	ADE,	SSAN, & UNIT	1	15. E	QUIPMENT WORN BY JU	MPI	ER	16	. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	IN IN ACFT
					ice Pack, Ballistic				#4 Iı	ımner	L/Door
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.			We	eapons Case, An				π+ J(imper	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)	-	SEMI-INVERSION	<u> </u>	Т	INVERSION	T	CIGARETTE ROLL	_	OTHER (SPECIEY)	-
	 	PILOT CHUTE	╅	十	BLOWN SECTION	十	BROKEN SUSPEN-		OTTIER (Jr ECII 17	1
T-10C			1			ı	SION LINE		Parti	4	
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION			22. RESULTING INJURY	′					
		ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in item 31)									
MIRP		X YES	7 NC)	Broke	n F	Foot(R)				
	_										
and the spring lai reserve approxim 32. CAUSE OF MAI Is possible wher addition with ex-	nate .Fun	NCTION/FAILU	GL RE (1	 If r	nore space is nee	ded	I, continue on	revo	erse.) hrougl	h his ri	
		CO	DN T	ΓI	NUED ON NI	EΧ	T PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was the jumper flipped through his risers.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The malfunction was caused by a weak exit.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Jumper should attend remedial training.

					CENTRA	_					
I. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPA	RTUR	E AIR	GENERAL	3.	DATE	4. 1	YPE ACFT	_	5. ACFT SER NO.
						"		1			
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION			4	C-13		
								•			
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Kno	ts)	11	DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WI	NDS (K	nots)	13. VISIB	LITY (Feet/Miles)
1250	İ	130			387		Calm			Ni	ght
II.	J				PERSONNI	L				· · · · · · · ·	
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, & UNIT		15.	EQUIPMENT WORN BY	JUMF	PER	ŀ	6. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	ON IN ACFT
					Alice Pack,	L	CE		2nc	l Pass	/3rd
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFU	ICTIO	N .				19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-INVERSIO	N,		INVERSION		CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (SPECIFY)	
MC1 1C		PILOT CHUTE			BLOWN SECTION	П	BROKEN SUSPEN-		Blo	wn	7
MC1-1C							SION LINE		Gor	e	74
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION			22. RESULTING INJU	RY					
24-Foot Troop	1	"No" explain in item 31)									
Chest		YES	\neg	NO	None						
	<u> </u>										
32. CAUSE OF MAL No suspected car submitted after re	ise :	has been es	stabl	lish	_					ollow-	up will be
								_			
		(CON	NT	INUED ON N	ΈΣ	KT PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a blown gore section.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was a material defect.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Quality deficiency report was sent.

1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED											
. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED			I a pender	DE ***	GENERAL	Τ-	DATE	4 =	VE 4.55=		A CET CER
			2. DEPARTU	RE AIR	KHIELD	3.	DATE		C-13		
i. OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION			C-13			
. O. EIGHTOWEACHCIDE					DE AND LOCATION			"	JAIL MA	- 1 HVIE	
). ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPI	EED (Knots)	11	1. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WINDS	(Kno	ts) 1	3. VISIBILI	TY (Feet/Miles)
3500		1	130		0		030/	/8		7	+
l.					PERSONNE	L					
4. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, &	UNIT	- 1	. EQUIPMENT WORN BY J			16	JUMPER'S	POSITION	I IN ACFT
					Wet Suit, BDU helmet, fins	s, p	oro-tec			Third	[
7. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFUN	стю	N				19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI	NVERSION (INVERSION		CIGARETTE ROLL	Ţ	OTHER (SI	PECIFY)]
MC-5		PILOT	CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPEN- SION LINE		Suspe Bag L		27 (MFF
0. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.		FUNCTION		22. RESULTING INJUR	Υ			<u>~</u> _		
			PERLY (If oplain in }								
			, YES	NO	No	ne)				
	<u>+</u>										
32. CAUSE OF MAI Bag lock	.FUN	CTION	N/FAILURE	E (If	more space is nee	ded	, continue on r	ever	se.)		
	LFUN	CTION	N/FAILURE	C (If	more space is nee	ded	, continue on r	ever	se.)		

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a bag lock.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was improper packing procedures.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

The packer needs to pack parachutes in accordance with all technical manuals.

					<u> </u>					
				GENI	RAL					
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTI	JRE AI	RFIELD		3.	DATE	4. TYPE ACFT	1	. ACFT SER NO.
		<u> </u>						C-13		
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE				7. DZ AND LOC	ATION			8. DATE A	ND TIME	
								<u> </u>	T	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	- [1	1. DZ ELEVATION	-		12. SURFACE WINDS	(Knots)	I	ITY (Feet/Miles)
1000 Feet AGL		130 Knots		190 F			320/3		/	Miles
II.			1.		ONNEL			1		
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), GI	RADE,	, SSAN, & UNIT	ľ	5. EQUIPMENT WO	ORN BY JU	МР	ER	16. JUMPER	R'S POSITIOI	N IN ACFT
				Rucksac	l I R	F	Keylar		40 toile	roto
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.			*	MALFUNC			1 1	#8, tail <u>g</u>	19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-INVERSION	-	INVERSION	T	Т	CIGARETTE ROLL	OTHER	(CDECIEV)	-
MC1 1C	┢	PILOT CHUTE	┿	BLOWN SECTION		+	BROKEN SUSPEN-		SPECIFY)	1
MC1-1C S/L Troop	1	PILOT CHOTE	1	BLOWN SECTIO	~	ı	SION LINE	Broke steeri	244	
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION-		22. RESULTIN	IG INJURY	_		SICCII	ng mic	<u> </u>
	l	ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in								
T 10		item 31)	1				N T			
T-10		YES	NO				None			
					<u>, </u>	_				
32. CAUSE OF MAL				-						
After speaking to			had	a very hard	lopen	in	g. Leaving m	e to susp	ect pos	sible
aircraft air speed	/we	eather.								
		CC	NT(INUED C	N NI	ΞX	T PAGE			
				, (43				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a broken left control line.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was excessive aircraft speed and the control line being too tight.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- Maintain proper aircraft speed.
 Pack in accordance with manual.

. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED			2. DEPARTU	RF AIE	GENERAL	12	DATE	14	TYPE ACET		S. ACFT SER NO.
Quan Deling AIREIFTED			LIDEFARIO	AIT		1	- PRIL	"			J. ACI I JER NU.
. OPERATION/EXERCISE			1	-	7. DZ AND LOCATION			٠Ļ	H-60 8. date a	ND TIME	
. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPI	EED (Knots)	1	I. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE W	INDS (A	(nots)	13. VISIBI	LITY (Feet/Miles)
9500		70 k	KIAS		Sea level		5-	10		Ur	limited
l.					PERSONN	EL				.	
4. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, &	UNIT	15	. EQUIPMENT WORN BY	JUM	PER	T	16. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	IN IN ACFT
					None					3	
7. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFL	NCTIC	ON				19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-I	INVERSION '		INVERSION		CIGARETTE ROL	l	OTHER (SPECIFY)	
		PILOT	CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION	i	BROKEN SUSPE	٧-	Hun	g	i
MT-1X	<u> </u>					Ш	SION LINE		Slid	er	110
0. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.		FUNCTION- PERLY (#		22. RESULTING INJU	JRY					
			cplain in								
MT-1S			YES	NO	ļ		Noi	ne			
								•			,
							_	_			
			CO	NT	INUED ON I	NEX	XT PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Hung Slider.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Improper packing procedures.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

					GENERAL							
UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPA	RTURI	E AIRF		3	. DATE	4.	TYPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.	
								1	H-6	0		
OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATIO	1			8. DATE A		•	
ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knot	s)	11.	. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)	•	12. SURFAC	E WINDS (Knots)	13. VISIB	ILITY (Feet/Miles)	
12000	1	70 KIAS		Sea Level 10 knots					Un	limited		
					PERSONN	EL					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
4. NAME (Last, First, MI), (RADE,	SSAN, & UNIT		15.	EQUIPMENT WORN BY	'JUM	PER		16. JUMPER	R'S POSITIO	ON IN ACFT	
7 7/05 PAGE (WITS	La				None	-				2		
7. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.		- 1		TYPE MALFL	NCH					19. NO. JUMP	
	_	SEMI-INVERSIO	<u> </u>	-	INVERSION	Н	CIGARETTE		OTHER ((SPECIFY)	4	
MT-1X		PILOT CHUTE			BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SU	SPEN-	Hu Slie	ng der	55	
O. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTIO ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in	N-		22. RESULTING INJ	JRY						
MT-1S		item 31)	\neg					Nor	10			
1011 15	<u> </u>	YES		NO	<u> </u>			1101	ic			
Unknown												
							_					
		(CON	NTI	INUED ON I	NE)	XT PAG	E				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Hung Slider.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Improper packing procedures.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED					GENERA	L					
ON BEING AIRCH IED			2. DEPARTU	RE All	 		DATE	4.	TYPE ACFT	ſ	5. ACFT SER NO.
									H-60	₎ [
OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATIO	N			8. DATE A		
ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	110	ACET SDEI	ED (Knots)	1.	1. DZ ELEVATION (Feet	1	12. SURFACE W	INDS /	(note)	12 VISIBI	LITY (Feet/Miles)
		70 KI		ı,	Sea Level	,	1	Kno			mited
12000		/0 K1	AS		PERSON	MEI	10	IXII	718	Oliii	mileu
• 4. NAME (Last, First, MI), (GRADE.	SSAN. & I	UNIT	In	EQUIPMENT WORN B		PER	1	16. JUMPER	'S POSITIC	IN IN ACFT
						one				1	
7. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALF	-	ON .				19. NO. JUMP
(Specify)		SEMI-IN	VERSION '	Т	INVERSION	T	CIGARETTE ROL	L	OTHER (SPECIFY)	7
MT-1X		PILOT	CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPEN	4-	Hun Slid	g er	200
O. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	ED PROP			22. RESULTING IN.	URY			Sild	<i></i>	1 200
		"No" exp item 31)									
MT-1S			YES	NO			None				
								_			
							_	_			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Hung Slider.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Improper packing procedures.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			GENERAL						
UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPAR	TURE	AIR		3	. DATE	4.	TYPE ACFT		S. ACFT SER NO.
						1			H-60)	
OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATIO	1			8. DATE A		
ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knots	,	11.	. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)	•	12. SURFA	CE WINDS (Knots)	13. VISIBII	ITY (Feet/Miles)
12000	ı	70 KIAS			Sea Level		10) Knots	S	J 11	nlimited
		70 1111 15			PERSONN	EL				<u> </u>	TIMTHCC:
4. NAME (Last, First, MI), (GRADE,	SSAN, & UNIT		15.	EQUIPMENT WORN BY	JUM	PER		16. JUMPEI	R'S POSITIO	N IN ACFT
					No	ne				4	
7. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.				TYPE MALFL	NCTI	ON				19. NO. JUMP
(Specify)		SEMI-INVERSION			INVERSION		CIGARETTE	ROLL	OTHER	(SPECIFY)]
MT-1X		PILOT CHUTE			BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SU	JSPEN-	Huns	g Slider	70
0. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION	L		22. RESULTING INJ	JRY			Trusti	Sonder	70
		ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in									
MT-1S	1	item 31)	╗.	N.C				N	None		
1411-119	<u> </u>	YES _	'	NO	<u> </u>			1	TOLIC		
32. CAUSE OF MAI Unknown	LFUN	CTION/FAILU	RE ((If 1	more space is no	eede	d, continu	e on re	verse.)		
							_	_			
		C	ON	\T]	INUED ON I	NE:	XT PA G	GE			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Hung Slider

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Improper packing procedures.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

I. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTU	RF AI	GENERAL	12	. DATE	T 4	. TYPE ACFT	1	S. ACFT SER NO.
. ONLI BEING AIRLIFTED		Z. DEPARTO	ne All	WILLD	'	. UMIE	۱	C-130		J. ACFT SER NU.
5. OPERATION/EXERCISE				7. DZ AND LOCATION				C-130		
. O. EIGHTOWEACHCISE				DE AND LOCKHON				I DATE A		
). ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	1	1. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE V	WINDS	(Knots)	13. VISIBI	LITY (Feet/Miles)
25,000		140		580		4	ļ		Unl	imited
 II.				PERSONN	EL				<u> </u>	
4. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, & UNIT	19	5. EQUIPMENT WORN BY	JUM	PER		16. JUMPER	R'S POSITIO	IN IN ACFT
	_			Oxygen					Th	ird
17. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.			TYPE MALFU	NCTI	NC				19. NO. JUMPS
(SDECITY)		SEMI-INVERSION		INVERSION		CIGARETTE RO	LL	OTHER ((SPECIFY)	
MC 4		PILOT CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPE	EN-	_	d suspen	ı-
MC-4	 _		لــــا		Ш	SION LINE		sion lii	nes	
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION- ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in		22. RESULTING INJU	жү					
		item 31)								
MC-4		VES X	NO							
				7						
32. CAUSE OF MAI	FUN	CTION/FAILURI	E (If	more space is no	ede	d, continue	on re	everse.)		
Entanglement of	· ma	in suspension	line	es with FF-2 cal	ole.					
		o F								
						_	_			
		00	N Tre	TAITIED AND	יהדן		,			
		CO	N'I	INUED ON I	NE)	AT PAGE	4			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

Main parachute lines entangled with the FF2 cable upon opening and caused a streamer.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Poor body position.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

Jumper should attend remedial training.

					GENERAL						
UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTI	RE A	IRFIE		3	. DATE	4.	TYPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.
								Γ	Win Ot	tter	
OPERATION/EXERCISE		-		7	. DZ AND LOCATION	1			8. DATE A		
ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	1.0	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	1.	<u></u>	Z ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE	MINDS /	Yanda)	12 1/16/10	LITY (Feet/Miles)
•	10			11. U				-	-	1	
1500 Feet		80 Knots			250 Feet PERSONN		00	Knot	S	L	Inlimited
I. NAME (Last, First, MI), (RADE.	SSAN, & UNIT	11	15. EC	UIPMENT WORN BY		PER		16. JUMPEI	R'S POSITIO	ON IN ACFT
										1 at 1	-h out
7. TYPE PARACHUTE	18. TYPE MALFUNCTION						1814	th out 19. NO. JUMP			
(Specify)		SEMI-INVERSION	Τ	Τ	INVERSION		CIGARETTE R	OLL	OTHER	(SPECIFY)	
MC1-1C		PILOT CHUTE		ľ	LOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUS	PEN-	Enta mer	angle-] 40
0. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION-		\exists	22. RESULTING INJ	JRY			Hier	ıc	
		ED PROPERLY (If "No" explain in item 31)		1							
T-10R		YES] NO	,		N	one				
				_							
32. CAUSE OF MAI Fourth jumper to					_					ght of	way.
							_	_			
		CO	N]	ΓIN	NUED ON I	NEX	XT PAG	E			

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a midair entanglement.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause of the malfunction was improper canopy control.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

Adhere to the three rules of the air:

- Maintain 50 foot separation from other jumpers.
 Turn right to avoid collision.
 Lower jumper has the right of way.

						_					
I. 1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		1.	. DEPARTU	DE AID	GENERAL	12.	DATE	A T	YPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		ľ	. DEPARTU	KE AIN	FIELD] . '	DATE	4. 1	C-13	$^{\circ}$	S. ACFT SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DZ AND LOCATION	<u> </u>		-	8. DATE A		
). OPERATION/EXERCISE					7. DE AND LOCATION				6. DA 1E A	ND TIME	
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEEL	O (Knots)	11	. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WIND	S (K	nots)	13. VISIBI	LITY (FeetiMiles)
12,500 Feet AGL	1	130 Kn	ots		300 Feet		7 Kno	ts		imited	
11.					PERSONNE	L					
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), G	RADE,	SSAN, & UI	NIT	15	. EQUIPMENT WORN BY	UMPI	ER	1	6. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	IN IN ACFT
					ALICE	D	1		114		
	T				ALICE	_			#1]	umpe	r, ramp
17. TYPE PARACHUTE (Specify)	18.				TYPE MALFUN	CTIO					19. NO. JUMPS
	-	SEMI-IN\		-	INVERSION	+	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (4
MC-4		PILOT CI	HUTE		BLOWN SECTION		BROKEN SUSPEN- SION LINE		Floa		75
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	1,1	RESERVE FI	INCTION	لــــا	22. RESULTING INJUR	,	J. O.Y EINE		Ripo	JOIU	13
EU. ITTE OF RESERVE	1 21.	ED PROPEI	RLY (H		ZZ. RESULTING INJUR	•					
3.50	1	item 31)	····								
MC-4		X vi	s	NO			Non	e			
							<u></u>				
at 2900 feet AG caught some sus main did not co	pen	sion lir	nes whi	ch s							
As stated in block cut-away proced was worn by the cause.	k 31 ures	, the ju s to ave	mper lo	ost c furtl	control of his rip ner incident. A p	cor	d twice resurce NOMEX	ıltir Kgl	ng in hi oves v	vith an	insert
							_	_			
			CO	NT	INUED ON N	EX	T PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a floating ripcord.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

- Possible loss of control as stated on the 1748.
 Possible contact upon exit or during freefall.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

- Execute proper separation during exit.
 Check ripcord during freefall.
 Maintain positive control of ripcord grip during pull sequence.

				<u></u>			_			
1. UNIT BEING AIRLIFTED		2. DEPARTU	RE AIF	GENERAL	3. 1	DATE	4.1	TYPE ACFT		5. ACFT SER NO.
1. OWN DEING AMERICE		2. 02. 2.00			[C-130		J. ACI I SER NO.
6. OPERATION/EXERCISE				7. DZ AND LOCATION	l		T	8. DATE A		*
							á			
9. ACFT ALTITUDE (Feet)	10.	ACFT SPEED (Knots)	1	1. DZ ELEVATION (Feet)		12. SURFACE WIND	S (K	nots)	13. VISIB	ILITY (FeetiMiles)
1250 Feet		130 Knots		384 Feet		08 Kno	ts		Un	limited
II.				PERSONNE	L				<u> </u>	
14. NAME (Last, First, MI), C	RADE,	SSAN, & UNIT	19	EQUIPMENT WORN BY J	JMPI	ER	1	6. JUMPER	'S POSITIO	ON IN ACFT
			1				١			
				Rucksack	M	249		1st/	4th ou	ıt
17. TYPE PARACHUTE	18.			TYPE MALFUN	TIOI	N				19. NO. JUMPS
(Specify)		SEMI-INVERSION		INVERSION	floor	CIGARETTE ROLL		OTHER (SPECIFY)	
		PILOT CHUTE		BLOWN SECTION	T	BROKEN SUSPEN-		broke	n contr	ol
MC1-1C						SION LINE		line br		12
20. TYPE OF RESERVE	21.	RESERVE FUNCTION- ED PROPERLY (#		22. RESULTING INJUR	Y					· · ·
		"No" explain in item 31)								
T-10R		YES	NO							
32. CAUSE OF MA A broken contro gore 6 section 2 The burns range the left side of g was a burn at th	ol ling. But some the second property of the	nction/failur ne bridle. After rns were noted om 1/4 inch to 5, 3/8 of an ind cation as well portion. The baccontrol line by	E (I d in o 3 i ch fi as c	on the right side was 4 inches in e, binding the ca	of the of	d, continue on the MC1-1C approximate ne control lir osest to the a the control l agth. It appear	re daly ant ine	verse.) amage 4.5 ind bridle v i-inver e bridle d that	was for the was brown of the was brown of the was brown of the was brown of the was believed to be was for the was	ound on a length. oken on let. There 2 inches was ing to slide
		CO	NT	INUED ON N	EΧ	T PAGE				

WHAT WAS THE MALFUNCTION?

The malfunction was a broken control line bridle on the canopy.

WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS TO HAPPEN?

The cause was material bunched up inside the modification area which allowed the control line bridle to be burned.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO KEEP THIS FROM HAPPENING?

The packer should ensure proper packing procedures to correct this problem.

SUMMARY OF SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT DROPS

3D TRIANNUAL CY 1998

		FORM DAD		GLE AINER	С	DS	TO'	TAL	
Number of Drops	14	1424		88	6	584	2696		
Number of Malfunctions		15	1	15		7	3	37	
Percentage of Malfunctions	0.0	010	0.0	025	0.	0.010)13	
Malfunction Phases:	IP	EF	IP	EF	IP	EF	IP	EF	
Extraction	6	6	4	5	5	9	15	20	
Deployment-Recovery	1	2	2	0	0	0	3	2	
Release	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

IP-Incorrect Procedures

EF-Equipment Failure

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL PARACHUTE JUMPS

3D TRIANNUAL CY 1998

		C-17	C-130	C-141	OTHER	TOTAL
	Number of Deployments	22	17,992	15,492	1,066	34,572
Nonmaneuverable	Number of Malfunctions	0	4	0	0	4
	Percentage of Malfunctions	0.00	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.011
	Number of Deployments	119	9,948	722	4,875	15,664
Maneuverable	Number of Malfunctions	0	5	0	1	6
	Percentage of Malfunctions	0.00	0.050	0.00	0.020	0.038
	Number of Deployments	43	2,040	57	2,752	4,892
Free-Fall	Number of Malfunctions	0	6	0	1	7
	Percentage of Malfunctions	0.00	0.029	0.00	0.036	0.014
	Number of Deployments	184	29,980	16,271	8,799	55,128
Total	Number of Malfunctions	0	12	0	1	12
	Percentage of Malfunctions	0.00	0.040	0.00	0.011	0.021

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL PARACHUTE MALFUNCTIONS

3D TRIANNUAL CY 1998

	NON- M ANEUVER ABLE	M ANEUVER ABLE	FREE-FALL	RESERVE
Number of Deployments	34,572	15,664	4,892	18
Number of Malfunctions	4	5	12	0
Towed Jumper	0	0	0	0
Broken Static Line	1	0	0	0
Entanglement	0	2	1	0
Failed to Inflate	1*	0	1	0
Inversion	0	0	0	0
Pilot Chute	0	0	0	0
Semi-inversion	0	0	0	0
Suspension Lines	0	0	1	0
Other	1	5	9	0
Percentage of Malfunctions	0.011	0.031	0.024	0
Fatalities	0	0	0	0

^{*}Injuries

INJURIES OCCURRING ON PARACHUTE OPERATIONS AS REPORTED ON DA FORM 285

1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1998

	C-17	C-130	C-141	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
PLF-Related Injuries	0	7	5	34	41
Main Malfunction	0	0	0	0	0
Misrouting of Static Line	0	0	0	2	2
Entanglements	0	0	1	1	2
Tree Landings	0	1	1	1	3
In Aircraft	0	0	0	1	1
Hazards on Drop Zone	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	3	0	7	10
Insufficient Information	0	0	0	0	0

AIRCRAFT MALFUNCTIONS

These malfunction reports are not included in the statistical data nor reflected in the percentage of malfunctions. All aircraft systems malfunctions which may have led to an abort or no-drop are constantly reviewed and analyzed for repeat or recurring trends and solutions. Corrective actions are recommended through Air Force maintenance systems.

PERSONNEL DROPS	
Improperly operating doors or ramps	0
Static line retriever	0
SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT DROPS	
Rail locks	3
Improperly operating ADS	3
Improperly operating doors or ramps	0
Release mechanism	1
Electrical system	0
CONTAINER DROPS	
Rollers	0
Type XXVI gate	3
Static line retriever	7
Center Line Vertical Restraint (CVR)	3
TOTAL	20

HOT POOP

- 1. The following airdrop and sling load manuals will soon be published:
 - a. FM 10-512, C5 (Rigging Typical Supply Loads).
 - b. FM 10-537, C5 (Rigging FARE).
 - c. FM 10-500-66 (Rigging 2-Litter Armored Ambulance).
 - d. FM 10-523 (Rigging Communication Control Vehicle).
 - e. FM 10-450-4, C1 (Single-Point Rigging Procedures).
- 2. The Air Force has issued a message on the FCIF. A copy can be found CLICK HERE
- 3. On 20 Jan 99 a message was sent out from TRADOC on requesting new publications. It read:

Effective immediately, TRADOC will be printing a limited amount of each new submitted publication. It will include two copies for ATSC's library, and the amount requested by the preparing agencies. This includes publications currently at Fort Eustis, VA for printing. Preparing agencies needing additional paper copies, other than the initial issue, will be required to provide funds to reprint these publications. ATSC will notify preparing agencies when publications are available on the ADTL home page http://www.atsc.army.mil/